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EAST TIMOR,

THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE (MEDIO) 1983

FEBRUARY 1986

commissie
justitia et pax ≡
nederland

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den haag, March 13, 1986

Dear friends,

Enclosed please find a free copy of the East Timor-report of the Dutch Justice and Peace Commission, which was prepared by Hein Schröder. Enclosed also a short summary of the report.

A few days ago we have sent some copies to Adriën Zöller, who tries to distribute it under the delegations of the annual meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

CIIR is planning to publish an english rewriting of our report as supplement of the Pro Mundi Vita-report, which was based on our first East Timor-publication.

From this place we would like to thank all the people who have delivered us the necessary information through which the report became possible.

More copies of the report are available at our office in The Hague.

With kind regards,

Victor Scheffers

Victor Scheffers
secretary.

commissie justitia et pax nederland

Summary and main conclusions from the report of Justitia et Pax - Nederland
East Timor, the most important developments from (medio) 1983

In the opinion of the Commission Justitia et Pax - Nederland the question East Timor is this year (1986), as an object of diplomatic consultation, in a crucial phase.
An important question is whether East Timor will again not be discussed in the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, according to its decision in 1985. Besides that it seems that the Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, would like to finish his assigned task as soon as possible.
Therefore the Commission Justitia et Pax considered it necessary to chart the most recent developments (from 1983); a summary of the result is before you now.
Diplomatic consultation is namely often characterized by a totally proper dynamic, provided by the international intercourse between states. For Justitia et Pax - Nederland a crucial question in its report is whether the United Nations in spite of this, yet succeeded in accomplishing a minimum quarantee for the enjoyment of human rights on East Timor (see further, p. 3).

For that purpose the report opens with a survey of the military developments from 1983, about which it notices in the conclusions:

- Operation Reunion in 1983, 1984 did not lead to the military elimination of FRETILIN, also in 1985 guerilla attacks still take place.
  Some tens of numbers of deaths occur monthly on Indonesian side.
  According to most sources FRETILIN exists of around one thousand armed guerrillas, supported by a few thousand relatives.
- Justice and Peace is concerned on the fact that FRETILIN fighters have resorted to intimidation of civilians in the past two years, in order to obtain food, etc. Also some civilians have been killed. FRETILIN announced itself that civilians who collaborated had been executed by them.
  The scale on which all this takes place is unknown, and the Indonesian claim that FRETILIN has degenerated to the level of a 'gang of raiders' is unfounded.

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Next the report goes further into the observance of the human rights in 1983 and 1984, raising for discussion successively the right to live, the treatment of prisoners and their right to have an honest procedure, and the freedom of movement of civilians * :

- In 1983, 1984, many people have disappeared or have been executed, according to several organizations among which Amnesty International. Amnesty also reports mass executions. In 1985 less violations have been reported, but this fits into the pattern (of a military calm period) and is as such no indication for improvement.

Indonesia strongly emphasizes its efforts on social-economic level on East Timor. That is why Justitia et Pax has gone further into the food situation, the facilities for the International Red Cross and the just mentioned Indonesian development efforts:

- It is feasable that the military operations in 1983 and 1984 led to local food shortages. Apparantly the situation in 1985 quickly recovered.
  A repeat of this during military operations in the future is well possible.
- During the military operations in 1983, 1984 the Indonesian authorities have strongly limited the activities of the International Red Cross.
  On this too a repeat is well possible in the future.
- Indonesia develops East Timor on the social-economic field in a speeded up pace, the reach and depth of this is unknown: independant, serious evaluations do not exist, there are doubs as to the question whether these developments come to the benefit of the Timorese population.

The East Timores church in particular its leader, the apostolic administrator, Mgr.Martinho da Costa Lopes, has critically followed the Indonesian policy until 1983. In May 1983 he has put down his function and has been succeeded by Mgr. Filipe Ximenes Belo. Has this line been continued under his leadership?

- Mgr.Filipe Ximenes Belo has continued the lines of his strongly criticised predecessor Mgr.Da Costa Lopes on the subject of the defence of human rights.
  He further pleads for the resumption of the negotiations which were broken off in 1983.
- Justice and Peace is convinced of the authenticity of the message issued on January 1985 by Mgr.Belo and the Presbyterian Council. In connection with the formulation of the Pope (July 1984) they point at the recent developments which are disastrous for the ethnic, religious and cultural identity of the Timorese people.

Indonesia has almost completely secluded East Timor from the outside world. The tidings about East Timor are scarce and unclear. Naturally reports and accounts of diplomats and journalists play an important part in the international fora. Justitia et Pax has gone further into some of them:

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- The reports on East Timor in three American government reports contain a number of errors, inaccuracies, important omissions, and on several places there is insufficient argumentation.
- Journalists who visit East Timor at the invitation of Indonesia are sufficiently aware of the dangers which are connected with this: the strongly guided character on the one hand and the great political import of their reports on the other hand.

Last the crucial question is raised whether the negotiations about East Timor within the diverse fora of the United Nations give minimum guarantees for the observance of human rights on East Timor: Concerning the Human Rights Commission Justitia et Pax concludes:

- The West-German respresentative has given incorrect information during the confidential 1503-procedure of the 1985 U.N.Commission on Human Rights (on the experiences of the West-German parliamentary delegation), in favour of Indonesia.
- The decision of the Commission for Human Rights in March 1985, not to discuss East Timor any longer, raises a number of questions:
  - in the discussion, it shows from the notes, one calls upon German and American reports for a supposed improvement. This basis is insufficient;
  - too much value is attacked to the social-economic development, claimed by Indonesia;
  - by leaving 'older cases of violation' outside the discussions, the pattern of violations which can be shown by them, is being disregarded.

Concerning the discussions between Indonesia and Portugal -under mediation of the Secretary-General- Justitia et Pax concludes:

- Adequate representation of the interests of the Timorese demands direct participation from the Timorese society, as shown by the disappointing course of the talks on religious liberty.
- Justice and Peace does not have the impression that the results offer serious guarantees in the area of religious freedom, the cultural identity or the social-economic development. This as contrasted with the Secretary-General of the U.N. as shows from his report.

The Commission Justitia et Pax - Nederland hopes, -with the report, from which this is a summary- to call attention to the East Timor question from government delegations, parliamentarians, official experts and interested non-governmental-organizations, from an angle of incidence which, in the opinion of the commission, gets too little attention in the discussions in official fora.
With that it hopes -embroidering on other publications about East Timor- to be able perhaps to contribute to a better enjoyment of human rights on East Timor.

/4.

The integral report can be ordered at Justitia et Pax -
Nederland
Statenlaan 35
2582 GC 's-Gravenhage, Nederland.

* Justitia et Pax itself is not able to verify reports of concrete individual violations of human rights. For this Justice and Peace is dependent on the reliability of other organizations. Therefore the report mentions whether or not the information has been verified by certain organizations from several independent sources, each time when concrete violations are discussed.

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INTRODUCTION

In April 1984 the Dutch Justice and Peace Commission published a report: "East Timor, developments since 1975".
The report inspired another publication: "East Timor", an issue of the Pro Mundi Vita dossiers (4/1985).
The French "Le Timor Oriental", as published by Echange France-Asie, was also based on the East-Timor report.

The Dutch Justice and Peace Commission is convinced that the East Timor question, as object of diplomatic discussion, has now reached a crucial stage. This is the reason why the Commission considered a further publication dedicated to the latest developments, as highly desirable.
In this new publication wide attention is given to diplomatic developments within the United Nations.

The Dutch Justice and Peace Commission itself is not in a position to check the alleged actual cases of Human Rights' violations. For this the Commission has to depend on the reliability of other organizations. When concrete violations are being mentioned in the present report, there is always added whether the information, given by different organizations, has been verified on the basis of data from different independent sources.

The report intends to give a general view, with extensive statement of the sources, of the developments in East Timor during the more recent years.
The flow of information coming from East Timor is by no means consistent.
Therefore the Commission considered it useful to compose a survey of all available information about certain particular events as uncovered in the course of the years.

The Dutch Justice and Peace Commission trusts that this report will prove useful for all those who are now professionaly involved in handling questions concerning the developments in East Timor and that it will be a source of better understanding of the situation on the island.

1. SHORT SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST TIMOR FROM 1974 TO 1983

The report aims to describe the situation from 1983 upto 1985 inclusive. In connection with the definition of thought a very brief summary follows of the period before (for an extensive description see: Justice and Peace Netherlands: 'Oost Timor, de ontwikkelingen vanaf 1975', April 1984). 1)

With the Carnation-revolution in Portugal, April 1974, the decolonisation-process was started in its colonies. In East Timor this lead to the foundation of three parties, the UDT, the FRETILIN and the APODETI, which could not agree amongst one another about the decolonisation process. In the end this led to the failed coup of the UDT in August 1975, from which the FRETILIN emerged as the winner. The Portuguese governor of East Timor retreated during the fights to the island Atauro, which lies off the Timorese coast, so that after the fighting had finished, FRETILIN was in control of government.
Under the threat of an Indonesian invasion, FRETILIN unilaterally declared independency on November 28, 1975, hoping to get international recognition. However, on December 7, 1975, the Indonesian invasion started, according to Indonesia after an invitation of the UDT and the APODETI.

The invasion was accompanied by many cruelties, plundering, murdering and executions. Although Indonesia, at the request of the 'temporary government' (installed by Indonesia), annexes East Timor on July 17, 1976, formally as its 27th province, the fighting was not over yet. In the military stalemate, in which Indonesia held the big cities and the northern coast and the FRETILIN the hilly islands, Indonesia started bombardments of the islands from the end of 1976. By the end of 1977 in these areas a food shortage arose. Refugees moved to the coast in masses. Also large parts of the population were in so-called 'resettlement-camps'. All this led to a famine at the end of 1978, of which the extent slowly started to penetrate the outer world after a 'guided' visit of foreign reporters and diplomats in October 1978. Then it still took until the end of 1979 before foreign aid-organisations, among which the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services, got permission from Indonesia to offer help.

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1) For an extensive description see:
- James Dunn, Timor a people betrayed, the Jacaranda Press, 1983, Australia
- Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Soei Liong, The War against East Timor, 1984, Zed Books Ltd., London
- Indonesia's vision can be read in: Department of Information, East Timor after Integration, Jakarta, July 1983

Even after the bombardments in 1978 and 1979 and the famine, the resistance was not broken yet. The fighting, however, took place on a smaller scale. Thus the capital Dili was the target of an attack, as late as June 10, 1980. The FRETILIN proceeded to restructuring in March 1981, and is since then under the leadership of J.A. Gasmaô, in Tetúm (the local language) described as Kay Rala Xanana. In April 1981 a new Indonesian military operation was started (Operation Security or Keamanan) in which the male population was mobilized as 'drivers', who have to drive the resistance ahead of them. Also this operation did not lead to the results Indonesia had hoped for.

Mgr. Lopes, at the time apostolic administrator (head of the Catholic Church in East Timor), wrote letters about this operation and the resulting threats of food-shortages to an Australian colleague, which were, however, published by the press and raised quite a dust. He was one of the few people who could openly comment on the Indonesian administration, when necessary he would take a stand for the population. Probably also because of great Indonesian pressure, he resigned his position in 1983; he was succeeded by Mgr. Belo.

The United Nations have never acknowledged the annexation by Indonesia, mainly because of the fact that during the realization of the request in 1976 of the 'temporary government' to Indonesia for integration, the criteria the United Nation require for guaranteeing the right of self-determination had not been met.
Indonesia, however, has ignored as well the two resolutions on East Timor of the Security Council (in 1975 and 1976) with binding action, as the yearly resolutions of the General Assembly, with recommended action. This stalemate has led the General Assembly in 1982 to give the General Secretary of the United Nations the mandate to try and get negotiations started between 'all parties involved'.

2. OPERATION REUNION, THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 1983 AND 1984

With exception of the situation at Atauro (see page 2), the reports about the developments on East Timor after Operation Security seem positive. UNICEF started an aid-programme on East Timor. As from May 1982 UNICEF, in cooperation with the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), has taken over the work of the International Red Cross during 1979 in the fourteen hardest hit villages. UNICEF concentrates its activities mostly on under-nourished young children and their mothers. Also Catholic Relief Services (CRS) have started a new aid-programme after Operation Security: an ambitious agricultural project to the value of 5 million dollars (paid by the U.S. Agency for International Development) in Raimata, situated by the Loes-river. According to the reports of the Australian Senate Committee and the parliament delegation, the Indonesian authorities give the impression that they seriously wish to improve the welfare of the East Timor people by developing East Timor as quickly as possible. 1) Thus it shows that the budget for East Timor on a 'per capita' basis is considerably higher than for the other provinces of Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities declare that they aim foremost at the improvement of the agricultural production.

Operasi Keamanan (Operation Security) did not end the resistance of FRETILIN. During the course of 1982 FRETILIN started a number of counter attacks, in which FRETILIN seized a military manual on December 31, 1982. This was smuggled abroad and was published in July 1983 (see further on).
There also seemed to be some positive developments in the military field. By the end of June 1983 FRETILIN representatives declared in Lisbon that in March of that year the Indonesian military had taken the initiative to reach a cease-fire with FRETILIN. On March 21 negotiations took place between J.A. Gusmaô (Xanana), leader of FRETILIN in East Timor, and Mario Carrascalâo, the governor of East Timor. On March 23 these negotiations were followed by a meeting between Xanana and Colonel Purwanto in the village Ossu. Colonel Purwanto is known as a supporter of a 'hearts and minds campaign', a psychological strategy, trying to persuade the FRETILIN fighters to return to society. 2)
FRETILIN agreed to a cease-fire but put up as a condition that Indonesia would

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1) Official Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Indonesia, p. 65; Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Human Rights and Conditions of the People of East Timor, p. 41.

2) Australian Parliamentary Delegation, op.cit. pp. 187-190

inform the U.N. and the Portuguese government about the negotiations. Food, clothing and medicine were issued to FRETILIN and wounded FRETILIN fighters were brought to a hospital. When, after 3 months, it occurred that neither the U.N. nor the Portuguese government had been informed, the representatives of FRETILIN arranged a press conference at Lisbon at which the facts were made public. Thereafter the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar issued a statement. He played down the negotiations by saying that it was only an initiative of governor Carrascalâo and the representatives of FRETILIN, to talk about amnesty. 1) Also Mr. Carrascalâo denied in a discussion with members of an Australian parliamentary delegation, who visited East Timor in July 1983, that Colonel Purwanto would have taken part in these negotiations. 2)
The FRETILIN, however, published a clear proof, a photo-report in which one can see Xanana and colonel Purwanto sitting together at a table on which was draped a flag of FRETILIN.

On August 8, 1983, a small incident takes place in the little village Kraras, near Viqueque, at which - according to Indonesian declarations - 16 unarmed soldiers get killed. According to Indonesia this violation of the semi-official truce is the immediate cause to start a large scale offensive, Operasi Persatuan (Reunion), in which at least 10.000 troops will participate. Several western governments accept this presentation without questioning. 3)
With this they disregard a number of indications which were in clear contradiction with this presentation:

- FRETILIN did point out the first news about the Kraras incident and the charge thereafter, some clear threats from Indonesia in that direction. 4)

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1) See also: Keesings Contemporary Archives, XXIV, July 1983, p. 32258.

2) Australian Parliamentary Delegation, op.cit. pp. 151 and further.

3) The American government, see Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983, p. 775.
The Dutch government, in answer to questions from parliament, parliamentary year 1983-1984, appendix of the Report no. 34.
The British/West German governments respectively, see The War against East Timor, Carmel Buiardjo & Liem Soei Liong, p.139.

Ost Timor, das vergessene Sterben, Klemens Ludwig and Korinna Horta, p. 54.
The United Nations, see Comments of Ramos Horta to the working paper by the Secretariat, in Record of the 1216 meeting A/AE 109/PV 1260, dated september 11, 1984, p. 7.

4) In March as well as in June Murdani would have sent messages threatening an attack. See: The War against East Timor, op.cit. p. 139 and IMBAS press release dated July 25, 1983.

- By the end of July an imminent attack was already announced in some publications, according to IMBAS (Initiatieve für die Menschenrechte aller Bürger der Asean-Staaten, Giessen, West Germany) on July 25, 1983:
  "Nach vertraulichen Informationen bereitet die Indonesische Armee gegenwärtig einen Grossangriff ... vor. .. 'Operasi Persatuan' wird nach unseren Informationen Anfang August stattfinden." 1)
- According to Marty Rendon, staff member of the American Congresman Tony Hall, refugees in Portugal reported a considerable reinforcement of troops in the months July and the start of August 1983 and the institution of a curfew. Further the population was being informed of an operation in the near future and they were advised not to try and get information about disappeared relatives. 2)
- Although in itself no proof, the difficulties which the Red Cross was up against, fitted the image: In Januari 1983 it agreed with the Indonesian government about aid to prisoners in four-monthly visits; at the same time the Indonesian government requested to postpone the first series of visits for an indefinite period of time. In July 1983 the Red Cross announced to have postponed the medical and food aid on the mainland, because the normal criteria of the Red Cross could no longer be met: "delegates could not have access to all villages where the evaluation of requirements would have had to be made for the purpose of subsequent distribution of aid". 3)
- The Indonesian version on the Kraras-incident: "an outrageous and mean FRETILIN attack on unarmed soldiers during a semi-official truce", has equally not been denied. East Timor Report reads that the cause of the murder on the Indonesian soldiers - according to a high ranked Timorese 'official' - would have been the disturbance of a village fête, followed by the rape of Timorese women by the Indonesians. Thereupon ex-FRETILIN guerillas who were being held prison in a nearby camp, would have attacked their guards and escaped. 4)

Whatever may be the exact facts of the case, at any rate the comments of Amnesty International deserve support: "The Indonesian authorities say their forces

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1) Press-release dated July 25, 1983.

2) Correspondence dated August 15, 1984 and Jill Joliffe, The Age, January 28, 1984.

3) ICRC update report dated October 18, 1983, p. 2.

4) Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), East Timor Report November 1983; see also The Australian of January 6, 1984.

military activity, which began in August 1983, was a 'follow up' to the Kraras-incident. However, reports of human rights violations associated with military operations were not confined to the vicinity of Kraras and continued well beyond August 1983." 1)

Halfway through August 1983 General L.B. Murdani, since March supreme commander of the armed forces and known as a 'hardliner', gives the signal for Operasi Persatuan: the Indonesian magazine Sinar Harapan writes that if FRETILIN does not surrender, the Indonesian troops will annihilate FRETILIN with all means they may have at their disposal. In November ACFOA reports that the number of Indonesian troops has by now been increased to 10.000 men. Extra helicopters, AMX-tanks, A-4 Skyhawks and IV-10 counterinsurgency-Bronco's have been supplied. 2) A month later, Christmas 1983, during a visit to East Timor, General Murdani warns: "those who are deluded enough to believe that they can set up a state outside the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia", that their trials are "doomed to failure because the Armed Forces will never stop performing the duty which they have been entrusted". His message to "everyone in the hills, the forests, the caves and the towers to halt their efforts and surrender to the authorities" was in fact a clear sign that the attack had failed. 3) Mgr. Belo, who wrote a letter in February 1984 to his predecessor Mgr. da Costa Lopes, acknowledges this: "(the Indonesian military) thought to finish off things by the end of December, but we are now already in February and the end of the military operations cannot be seen. It is amazing", Mgr. Belo aids, "that with so many battalions, helicopters, tanks and bomber-aircraft they still need the support of civil militia" (a reference to the obligatory mobilization of the civil militia, see further on.)

The AFP reports in the beginning of January to have learned from diplomatic and catholic sources that as a result of the operations the food supplies have been completely disorganised, which led to a growing food shortage. "Mass moving, fights and arrests are the order of the day: in Dili recently 600 people were picked up for interrogation and 125 in Bacau and 34 in Viqueque." 4)
The attacks were being continued until far into 1984. ACFAO points to intensi-

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1) Amnesty International, Violations of human rights, 1985, p. 52;

2) Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), East Timor Report, November 1983. Also see The Australian, dated January 6, 1984.

3) Sinar Harapan, dated December 13, 1983, translation TAPOL.

4) AFP-ANP press release dated January 8, 1984 (ANP 209 4 bui '84 afp-anp df).

vation in May, the forces were being brought to a strength of 14.000 men in the hope of delivering a final blow to FRETILIN. Also during this campaign the population (youngsters and men obligatory) was mobilized; also this time the care for them (food. medical care) is insufficient. 1)
According to FRETILIN, in a radio message in February and March 1985, the balance of the offensive is 78 dead and wounded on FRETILIN-side (excluding executions in retaliation in connection with Kraras) and over 600 dead and wounded on the Indonesian side. The AFP learned in April 1984 in church and diplomatic circles in Jakarta a number of around 200 Indonesian soldiers and approximately equally heavy lossed for FRETILIN. 2)
The Indonesian authorities did not comment on the losses; "fighting is worse than expected" and "losses were too high" is all they say. 3)

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1) Letter from a priest in East Timor of July 14, 1984 (extracts). Refugees in Lisbon, Jill Joliffe, The Age, June 29, 1984. AFP, February 10, 1984.

2) East Timor News, Winter 1985, p. 11. AFP in NRC-Handelsblad dated April 12, 1984.

3) AFP, February 19, 1984.

3. THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 1985

During an interview with Reuter in December 1984, General Murdani says that there are only rare squirmishes between FRETILIN and the Indonesian army. The number of troops has been reduced to a good 7000, but more time is needed to solve the conflict. During the course of 1985 the military commander of East Timor, Colonel Rudito, known as a hardliner, is replaced by the more moderate-minded Rahardjo. The number of Indonesian soldiers remains about constant.

In July 1985 some foreign journalists visit East Timor. Two of them manage to penetrate into the 'Cemetery for fallen Heroes' in Dili, where they count 84 graves for 1985, of which 74 are fallen for muslems. Further there is an even more crowded cemetery in Bacau according to the people. 1) Asia Week reports to have learned from military source that "up to 30" soldiers get killed per month. 2) These numbers match the numbers given by FRETILIN for January and February reasonably: 37 Indonesian and 22 Timorese soldiers, 20 attacks spread over all of East Timor. 3)
According to a letter dated February 20, 1985, the fighting would take place all over East Timor, while Asia Week reports: "While the western part of the province is almost entirely pacified, in the eastern sector only road links and towns and surrounding areas are considered under full control. Villagers define the rest as a 'riskzone'." 4)

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1) Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) dated August 8, 1985, p. 22. AFP In the Age, July 9, 1985.

2) Asia Week, August 2, 1985, p. 31.

3) TAPOL, July 1985, p. 10.

4) Tomado de Posiçao perante o documento 'Religious life in East Timor', May 20, 1985, p.4. Asia Week, August 2, 1985, p. 31, respectively.

4. FRETILIN

For a long time the Indonesian military commanders maintained that there were a hundred armed guerrillas at the most; 130 supported by 200 sympathizers according to an Indonesian military commander in April 1982.
FRETILIN itself claims a minimum of 6800, in a document dated October 1982. 1)
Pat Walsh of ACFOA quoted in July 1983 a well informed Timorese clerical source who estimated the FRETILIN at ten units of 120 men each, of which four units were armed with modern weapons.
Also the Indonesian authorities occurred to have adjusted their estimation by December 1984: 500 to 700 armed guerrillas, was the estimate of general Murdani, and 7000 to 10.000 including relatives and sympathizers. 2)
The AFP quoted in February 1984 a clerical source who estimated the number at over 800 guerrillas. 3) The image has hardly changed since then. 4)

From statements of FRETILIN over the last three years some willingness to search for solutions can be drawn, be it that the demands for the right of self-determination for the Timorese people is refused to compromise upon. It was stated in a FRETILIN statement of May 20, 1983:
"We resist with arms but we don't refuse dialogue .... dialogue cannot be restricted to Portugal and Indonesia. FRETILIN is the party with the highest interest .... We are very aware that the problem of East Timor affects the geopolitical zone in which we live, particularly Australia and Indonesia .... The Maubere people know that they must respect the interest of their neighbours." 5)
The FRETILIN peace offer which was presented a year later provides negotiations between Indonesia, Portugal and FRETILIN. 6)
Also statements of FRETILIN reflect the willingness to reach a peaceful solution. 7) In a message before the conference of the Non Aligned Countries in Luanda in September 1985, FRETILIN once more urged for a consideration of the propositions that had been brought forward by FRETILIN. 8)

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1) Keesing Contemporary Archieves, vol. XXIX, p. 32258.
2) Reuter dated December 17, 1984.
3) AFP dated February 19, 1984; in the same sense refugees in Lisbon, Jill Joliffe, The Age, May 28, 1984.
4) See Asia Week, dated August 2, 1985, p. 30.
5) Quoted in Carmel Budiardjo, Liem Soei Liong, The War against East Timor, p. 150.
6) Ibidem, p. 150.
7) See CIIR, Timor Link no. 4, December 1985, p.6.
8) TAPOL, September 1985, p. 22.

On May 26 a number of reporters and politicians witness how, somewhere at an unknown place about 100 km outside Darwin (Australia), radio contact is made with FRETILIN in East Timor. The first contact dated January 1985. To this day the contact has proved an important source for fast and detailed information on the developments in East Timor.

A new element in the discussions at international level about East Timor was the accusation by Indonesia of cruelties, plundering and murders on the ordinary people committed by FRETILIN in its search for food. Thus quoted the Indonesian observer to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in February 1985 Mgr. Belo, who stated in an interview with The Age on July 31, 1985, that:
"FRETILIN had rapidly lost popular support by intimidating or punishing villagers who refused them help and now relied for physical support on relations and thefts of food ... They have killed villagers and burned houses. It also intimidates people into giving them food and help." 1)
The AFP and Asia Week, part of a group of reporters who visited East Timor in July 1985, name some concrete cases, among which an attack on January 8 in Iliomar, in which 21 Timorese and local militia were killed. 2)

Indeed FRETILIN reported on January 18, 1984, to have executed several Timorese collaborateurs. Also a Timorese priest gave examples of searches of FRETILIN for food in some villages, at which some civilians die, amongst others Caravela. He continues to say:
"The village of Caravela has no church. The missionary from Bacau from time to time celebrates Mass in a house of the village. It happened that one of the houses where the priest had held Mass was burnt down. On the 15th of May the Prelate of the diocese of Dili together with the Governor was invited by the Indonesian military to visit the place in order to see how 'communist' FRETILIN is because it burns churches. But the Prelate, who arrived on the 15th still could see the rests of the house burning. But the FRETILIN attack had been on the 14th. How is it possible that a simple Timorese house, all made of straw and wood, takes more than 24 hours to burn down? The military also accused FRETILIN of burning statues of saints that were in the church. But there was no statue of a saint because the house was not a church and had no statues of saints." 3)

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1) Statement by Ambassador A. Atalas, observer delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, to the 41st session of the Commission of Human Rights, Geneva February 20, 1985.

2) AFP in The Age, July 9, 1985. Asia Week, August 2, 1985, p. 29.

3) Letter East Timorese priest dated July 7, 1984.

With reference to the attack on January 8 in Iliomar, is has to be remarked that FRETILIN reports a FRETILIN-attack on January 8, in which 10 Hansip-soldiers (civil militia members) got killed, and a retaliation attack in which 40 civilians were executed. 1)

The developments in this respect are certainly alarming. But to write of "longstanding characteristic" as the American Department of State does, is not correct. 2)
The mutual weighing of total numbers of victims is not a right thing to do. However, a remark of Mgr. Belo which was selectively quoted by the Indonesian delegation deserves attention: according to him both parties have dirtied their hands, but the Indonesian army is far more guilty. 3)

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1) Tapol July 1985, p. 10; September, p. 22.

2) Updated Background report of Department of State on East Timor dated August 25, 1984.

3) AFP dated July 27, 1984.

5. CIVIL HUMAN RIGHTS

5.1 Extrajudicial executions, disappearances, torture and arrests

From different sides reports have been published which report violations of civil human rights during the period August 1983 till the end of 1984. 1) Pax Christi and Pax Romana presented a report before the U.N. Human Rights Commission in February 1985, which mentioned for the period August 1983 to July 1984: 132 cases of detention without charges, followed by torture, 61 deportations, 8 disappearances, 17 extrajudicial executions and 17 named detention centres in the eastern part of Timor. 2)

In March 1985 Tapol publishes a summary on the period from August 1983 to the end of 1984 based on FRETILIN material, also confined to the eastern part of East Timor: 18 cases of detention, 101 cases of torture, 17 executions and 26 disappearances. 3)

Justice and Peace lacks the means to check if all these cases can be confirmed by several, independent sources. This, however, has been done by Amnesty International, which publishes an extensive report on East Timor in July 1985: Apart from the arrests of some hundreds of persons, Amnesty publishes a list of 71 disappearances and executions since August 1983. 4)

In addition Amnesty reports the execution of around 200 people in Kraras in an Indonesian retaliation attack, and the execution of around 100 people in Hauba in March 1984. 5) The first fact had been mentioned by Mgr. Belo earlier, when he declared to Reuter that he had the names of 84 victims and that he had seen 2 mass graves. 6)

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1) An overview of the human rights violations up to 1983 can be found in: Amnesty International, East Timor violations of Human Rights (92 pages).

2) Written communication submitted by Pac Christi and Pax Romana, February 13, 1985, E/CN/1985/NGO/25.

3) Tapol, March 1985, pp. 1-17.

4) Amnesty International, East Timor violations of human rights, extrajudicial executions, 'disappearances', torture and political imprisonment, july 1985, p. 41, 86-87 respectively.

5) Ibidem, p. 52.

6) Reuter, March 1, 1985.

For the period as from January 1985 Amnesty received less reports of violations, but the materials which are at the organisation's disposal suggest that the disappearances and at random arrests and detentions continue. Periods of massive violations have, in the past, always been relieved by relatively quiet periods, so that a decrease of the number of reported violations in itself may not be seen as an indication that the observance of the human rights is now guaranteed. 1)
FRETILIN has reported via radio contact in Iliomar in January, 40 civilians would have been killed, also as a relatiation in May in Viqueque 50 civilians in a camp and finally 24 civilians in Bobonaro in January. 2)

In relation to prisons and the situation in these prisons Amnesty remarks to foremost base itself on informations on prisons in Dili and Atauro.
"The scale of imprisonment in East Timor as a whole is unknown. It has been reported that officially designated prisons exist in all 13 adminiatrative districts of the territory. Information on most of these is scarse. However, few reports have been received of political prisoners being held in such places." 3)
We have mentioned the list of 17 detention centres in the eastern part of East Timor before, which was presented by Pax Christi and Pax Romana. On the conditions in the Comarco-prison in Dili, Amnesty remarks that these seriously deteriorated, mostly in relation to the food, when the Red Cross could not visit this prison from the end of 1982 to the Spring of 1984. 4)
Additionally, according to Amnesty, in April 1979 and February 1982 shortly before the Red Cross visit was expected, prisoners were temporary removed from the Comarca prison. There are likewise reports on other prisons also. 5)
The International Red Cross and Indonesia had come to an agreement about the re-instatement of these visits but the authorities had requested the Red Cross at the same time to postpone the visits till the end of 1983. Later once again an agreement was reached that provided visits in four fases "on a step-by-step basis, extending them gradually to all detention centres", resulting in a first visit to the Comarca prison in March 1984. 6)

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1) Amnesty International statement on East Timor to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, dated August 8, 1985, ASA/21/30/85, p. 2.

2) Tapol, September 1985, p. 22; CIIR Timorlink, October 1985, p. 4. Justice and Peace has not been able to verify this with several independant sources.

3) Amnesty International, East Timor violations of human rights, p. 60.

4) Ibidem, p. 64.

5) Amnesty International, ibid. p. 64. Em Timor-Leste a Paz à Possível, no.12, 1986, p. 6.

6. ICRC East Timor report no. 11, p. 3; underlining by the author.

The remarks of the Indonesian representative before the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations that: "... (the) periodic visits by ICRC to prisons in East Timor ... have been and will remain to be an additional guarantee of the well-being of the people in these locations" is in no way supported by the facts upto this date, certainly not now the authorities have not shown a lasting willingness to grant the Red Cross access. 1) Further it is at this moment utterly indistinct which part of the total number of prisons can be visited by the Red Cross. The governor of East Timor claims that outside Dili there are no prisons. Reporters doubt that because they thought to have seen a prisoners transport, on its way to the inland. 2)

5.2 Trials

As from December 1983 Indonesia started to try prisoners. In February 1985 79 persons have been tried and given prison sentences of 6 upto 17 years, according to Indonesia all according to the criteria of an honest trial as laid down in the articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights. On this Amnesty observes:

- "No public announcement of them is made in East Timor ..." 3)
- "There are grounds for concern that the accused may not have been provided with defence councel of their own choice .... may not have had adequate time to prepare their defence .... judicial procedures may not have been adequately understood .... ability to cross-examine witnesses may have been limited ... interrogation depositions may have been extracted by force." 4)

The jurisdiction of the Indonesian Court was brought up for discussion by an ex-Portuguese soldier. In the end he accepted the sentence (being 11 years imprisonment), because he was told that it was the alternative for execution. 5)

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1) Statement by Mr. Nana S. Sutresna, representative of the Republic of Indonesia, to the 41st session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, March 1, 1985; underlining author.

2) F.E.E.R., dated August 8, 1985, p. 24.

3) That these trials will be reported in the international media, as Indonesia emphasizes (see footnote 1 op.cit. p. 7); underlining author.

4) Amnesty International, Statement on East Timor to the U.N. Committee on Decolonisation, dated August 8, 1985, ASA/21/30/85, p. 4.

5) Jill Joliffe, The Age, June 29, 1984.

"So far each of the 100 or so defendants who have come before court have pleaded guilty, their lawyers said", according to the F.E.E.R., "guilty pleas mean a saving of time, defence attorneys explained". 1)
By now there are list circulating which the Indonesian government has supplied to the United Nations; one of these consisting the names of 157 persons who have been passed sentence on. On these lists are the names of persons who have been reported missing to Amnesty. Dates of the arrests or precise charges were not mentioned on this list. Therefore it is not possible to check whether the sentences were relatively light, as is being claimed by some, and neither is it possible to check whether the detention period before the trial is included in the sentence. 2) Thus Wenceslau de Carvalho was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment after 8 years detention awaiting trial. 3) The other list includes names of 50 persons who have been released; these names do not occur on the former list, which is a confirmation of the practice of arrest and detention without charges. Out of the 157 sentences, 43 prisoners remain, according to Annesty, in or near Jakarta, which makes it almost impossible for relatives and friends to visit them.

5.3 Military manuals

In July 1983 Amnesty International received a number of manuals, issued by the Indonesian commander for East Timor, which contained amongst others guidelines which allow the use of torture when other methods have failed. Amnesty had the manuals checked by experts who have confirmed the authenticity on the grounds of the military terminology, the nature of the maps and diagrams, the format and the style, the official stamps and the deep unterstanding of the military organization structure and tactics. 4) Indonesia doubted the authenticity, without bringing hard proof. It is true that Indonesia justly pointed out that the Ministry of Defence and Security (HANKAM) never published such guidelines, but that has never been said by Amnesty. The way in which the US Department of

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1) F.E.E.R., August 8, 1985, p. 24.

2) Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1984, US Department of State, p. 772; F.E.E.R., August 8, 1985, p. 24.

3) Amnesty International, East Timor, violations of Human Rights, p. 80.

4) Amnesty International, East Timor, violations of Human Rights, 1985, p. 12.



KOMANDO RESORT MILITER 164
WIRA DHARMA
KOMANDO DISTRIK MILITER 1628

SURAT IJIN JALAN
NOMOR : SIJ IV / 1985.

1. DIBERIKAN IJIN JALAN KEPADA :
NAMA :
UMUR / KELAMIN :
PEKERJAAN :
ALAMAT : KOTA BAUCAU
Ciri - Ciri Chusus.
MATA : BIASA
RAMBUT :
KULIT :
MUKA : BIASA
TUJUAN : DILI
KEPERLUAN :
BERANGKAT TGL. : APRIL 1985
KEMBALI TGL. : MEI 1985
: KEPERLUAN SEHARI_HARI
ANGKUTAN : DARAT
PENGIKUT : 1. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
2. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
3. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
4. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

2. LAIN - LAIN : WAJIB LAPOR KEPADA-INSTANSI MILITER/ SIPIL SETEMPAT.
: HARAP KEPADA YANG BERWAJIB, DAPAT MEMBERIKAN BANTUAN SEPERLUNYA.-

3. SELESAI.

DIKELUARKAN DI : BAUCAU
PADA TANGGAL : 1985

A.N. KOMANDAN
KOMANDO DISTRIK MILITER 1628
KEPALA STAF

SIMET ARIGDO.
MAYOR INF NRP. 24242.-

TEMBUSAN :
1. KODIM 1627/ DILI.

Surat-Jalan (travel pass) issued by the end of April 1985 for a journey from Bacau to Dili and back.

State finished with the matter is below standard:
"In July Tapol, a London-based organization which is a strong critic of the Indonesian Government, published what was purported to be a 'torture manual' ... There is no evidence of the authenticity of the document." 1)
Not a word was mentioned about Amnesty and the checks carried out by Amnesty.

5.4 Further aspects

The above description concentrates on the most elementary rights, which affect the physical existance directly. However, also in other areas human rights are being restricted. In all his letters Mgr. Belo emphasizes that the mail is being censored. Civilians cannot move freely but always need a 'surat jalan' (travel pass). Alongside this page a picture of a surat jalan, issued by the end of April 1985 for a journey from Bacau to Dili (around 100 kilometres) and back. On the surat jalan one can make out around fourteen different stamps and signatures of the various posts one apparently has to pass. Also the resettlement (see page 2) continues. 2) According to Amnesty the number of Timorese who have been 'resettled' since 1975, comes between 150.000 and 300.000. The military manuals confirm the taking place of this resettlement for military, strategical reasons 3), sometimes to places which are being avoided by the population because of the barren land or illnesses e.g. malaria. Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council (Meeting of all priests in the area) point out that the bad circumstances in these camps "sans possibilité de s'alimenter elles-mêmes en cultivant leur terres, dependented uniquement des aides qui leur parviennent de temps à autre". 4) In this the limitation imposed upon the population, amongst others for safety reasons, play a part, especially the situation and cultivation of vegetable gardens and agricultural fields. 5) The Red Cross remarks on this:

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1) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983, US Department of State, p. 777; underlining by the author.

2) Tapol, January 1985, p.1.

3) See guideline 'Plan to re-structure the trained people's forces (Ratih)', paragraph 'Development of New Settlement Areas', printed in Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War against East Timor, p. 243.

4) Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique et du Conseil Presbytéral du diocèse de Dili, January 1, 1985, p. 4.

5) See guideline 'How to protect the community from influence of GPK Propaganda, printed in Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War against East Timor, p. 219.

"... ICCR recommended ... an extra 1000 tons of maize ... in view of the anticipated poor harvest in 1982, due to drought during the planting season in 1981 and because inhabitants of some villages, being restricted in their movement, had not been able to cultivate sufficient ground." 1)

When necessary, the Indonesian authorities do not shrink from a very intensive check of the daily going-ons of the population in a village:

a) "Appoint reliable people as Katuas ('elder' in Tetum) ... each Katuas takes responsibility for 10-15 families. Each Katuas must be able to know exactly the activities of the families under his guidance; for example when they go to their field, go to collect wood, get permission to go to another village, to send flocks, go to market and so on.
b) Appoint an 'informer' in each of these groups of 10-15 families led by one Kakuas. This informer should be able to follow, secretly, all the activities of the 10-15 families ...
c) Maintain an element of surprise (pendadakan) by holding extraordinary roll-calls, or by having check-ups on the population by the Katuas ...". 2)

During military operations as well as during the relatively quite periods, the population is being recruted for military and civil work:

- "Mobilisation de mineurs pour participer aux opérations militaires comme TBO, forces auxiliaires d'opérations; ...
- Récrutement des éléments valides de la population retirés des tâches habituelles et orientés vers les opérations militaires;
- Service obligatoir des veilles de nuit réalisé dans des conditions inhumaines;
- 'Gotong Royong' (mutual help) programmé et executé sans considérer les besoins de la population." 3)

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1) Yearly report 1982, ICRC, quoted in Amnesty International East Timor, violations of Human Rights, p. 70.

2) Guideline 'How to protect the community from the influence of GPK Propaganda', op.cit. pp. 218-219.

3) Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique et du Conseil Presbytéral du Diocèse de Dili, January 1985, p. 5. Underlining by the author.

5.5 Atauro

The island Atauro, situated 15 km off the coast, was put into use as a detention centre from 1980. The highest number of prisoners was reached by the end of 1982. Then, there were about 4000 people being interned. According to the Indonesian government these people, mostly women and children, were put there temporarily, for security reasons and some for their own safety. 1)

The Australian parliamentary delegation (see p. 39), however, mentions in this connection "detainees" 2) and Amnesty International writes: "Atauro and other places of detention". 3)
Even clearer is the Indonesian military manual, which was seized by FRETILIN and later published by Amnesty (see page 16). In the guidelines given in this manual to destroy the GPK 4) (i.e. FRETILIN) supporting network, is written: "Physically separate GPK support by ... moving to another place people with relatives who are GPK still active in bush ... Evacuate to Atauro ... the network of GPK support" (underlining by the author). 5)

At first the situation at Atauro was very bad. The island itself, which numbered around 5000 inhabitants, offered absolutely insufficient possibilities to be able to feed these people. Therefore the International Red Cross still qualifies its aid programme on Atauro in 1985, when the number of people has already decreased to 1172, as a 'vital lifeline'.
The food that had been supplied weekly by the government was insufficient. There was also a shortage in medicine, gastro-enteritis and malaria were frequently occurring diseases. According to official statistics during the period

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1) Reuter Report of a press conference of the International Red Cross, March 1982, in ACFOA, Dossier on East Timor, p. 25.4.

2) Official report of the Australian parliamentary delegation to Indonesia, July-August 1983, p. 177.

3) Statement of Amnesty International's concern in East Timor, AUgust 1983 ASA/21/09/83, p.8.

4) Acronym for Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanam, Indonesian for gangs, disturbers of peace, official name for FRETILIN.

5) Quoted in: Amnesty Internationa, East Timor violations of Human Rights, extrajudicial executions, 'disappearances', torture and political imprisonment, 1975-1984, p. 65.

June 1981 and May 1982, 176 died, which is around 4,4%, in relation to the normal mortality rate for South East Asia a very high percentage. [1]
In February 1982, however, the International Red Cross was enabled by the Indonesian authorities to visit Atauro, after which an agreement was reached on a food aid programme of the International Red Cross for Atauro. From then on Atauro has been the only place which received continuous aid from the International Red Cross, which led to a clear improvement of the physical condition.

The situation in 1985 remains critical. Many have been staying at Atauro for several years against their will, completely dependant on food aid, only because of alleged sympathies for FRETILIN or because of relations who whould be active in the resistance. In the spring of 1983 the number of people at Atauro had been reduced to 2100, but from time to time the process of relocation is interrupted. Although the Indonesian spokesmen have announced the definite evacuation several times, the term mentioned cannot be met. In June 1985 still 1172 people were being detained at Atauro. [2]

In fact this is not quite a big surprise. In fact the problem is that the Indonesian authorities made the relocations completely dependant on the extent to which they could control the guerrilla-activities.
"Governor Carrascalaô has stated his intention to end detentions on Atauro as soon as the security situation permits". [3] As soon as the security decreases, the relocations are being ended. This was confirmed by the German delegation of members of parliament who visited Atauro in 1985:
"Der äussere Eindruck tiefer Niedergeschlagenheit und beklemmender Rat- und Hoffnungslosigkeit bestätigte sich in den Antworten auf die Frage nach der voraussichtlichen Dauer der Zwangsaufenthalts, der für manche schon länger als vier Jahre dauert und dessen Ende von den Betroffenen nicht abgeschätzt werden kann, weil sie ohne Gerichtsverfahren hierher verbracht und von den Behörden bewusst darüber im Unklaren gelassen wurden wann und ob überhaupt sie jemals wieder in ihre Dörfer würden zurückkehren können." [4]

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1) Pro Mundi Vita, Facts and Figures of the Catholic Church in Asia, 2-3/1984, mentions for Indonesia 1,5% and for Vietnam 3,7%.

2) ICRC report no. 15, August 1985, p. 2.

3) Department of State background report on East Timor, dated July 25, 1985.

4) Bericht über die Informationsreise einer Delegation der Deutsch-Asean Parlementariergruppe nach Indonesien vom 9. bis zum 24. Februar 1985, p. 56; underlining author.

In fact this is a permit for unlimited detention: the present Indonesian policy gives no guarantees whatsoever that there will be no new detentions as soon as the security situation, in the eyes of Indonesia, demands it. In fact this is a very serious violation of the human rights.
"Sie (the German delegation) verwies (den Gouverneur) auf die schwerwiegenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die darin zu sehen seien, dass hier Menschen ohne jede Gerichtsverhandlung jahrelang festgehalten würden, deren vermeintlichten Schuld darin bestehe, dass sie Väter und Söhne hätten, die sich dem Anschluss Ost-Imors an Indonesien wiedersetzen."1) It is therefore incomprehensable that in the international human rights forums the (western) states have never brought this Indonesian policy in itself up for discussion, but limited themselves to questions about the speed of the relocationing. In doing this they silently approve the Indonesian policy.

About the condition of those who have been 'relocated' there still is obscurity. There are reports that they were sent to places far from their own home, sometimes even to areas where a language was spoken they did not know; according to other reports the conditions in which they have been housed are very poor, there is a shortage of food, sometimes 600 people have been added to a village of only 1000 inhabitants; other reports again state that since recently people are being 'resettled' again. 2)
Justice and Peace was not capable to verify these reports itself.
Amnesty pointed at the relocation to places far from their original home, in resettlement camps with restricted freedom, and at the bad circumstances in which the relocated were being housed. 3) According to the Indonesian authorities, however, only 600 (of the 3000 relocated persons) have been placed outside their 'home-districts'. At first, many were relocated far away, but at this moment more are being placed in their 'home-district' and sometimes even in their own home-villages. 4)

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1) See note 4) p. 20.

2) See resp. Asia Partnership for Human Development, no. 22, p. 4. Droits et Libertés Réligieuses au Timor Oriental, A Paz á Possível em Timor-Leste, Juillet 1985, p. 13. Pax Romana, intervention à la 41-ième session de la Commission des Droits de l'Homme, p. 3. Em Timor-Leste, a Paz á Possível, no. 12, p. 9. Pax Romana. op.cit., p. 3.

3) Resp. Amnesty International, written statement Commission on Human Rights, 41st session, dated February 4, 1985, p. 3. Statement on East Timor to the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization, p. 4.

4) See Steven Jones, Indonesia to free East Timor detainees, Asian Wall Street Journal, March 11, 1985, p. 1.

The Secretary General of the United Nations is of the opinion that the majority of people is being relocated to their home villages.[1] However it may be, the condition of the relocated was apparently for the Red Cross the motive to keep following these people, even after their return to the mainland; some indeed appeared to need food aid and medical care.[2]

Before the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations the Indonesian representative remarked in March 1985:

"... among the people temporarily settled in Atauro, there are many who wish to remain in Atauro. That is quite natural since Atauro is neither a prison or a detention camp",

after which follows the summing up of the many facilities which are at the disposal of the people on Atauro.[3]

The fact that not all the people wish to be returned is confirmed by the F.E.E.R., the motives occur to be of quite a different nature:

"It is hardly that we like it so much here ... but rather that we are afraid to let them ship us back ... Some of our sources (fishermen who pass on the news; author's note) say that returnees never arrived where they were told they were going. Other reports have it that even those who did reach the resettlement camps, found themselves as closely guarded as we are here."[4]

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1) Progress report of the Secretary General, dated August 11, 1985, p. 4.

2) ICRC report no. 15, p. 5.

3) Statement by Mr. Nana S. Sutresna, representative of the Republic of Indonesia to 42st session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, March 1, 1985, p. 14.

4) F.E.E.R., Lincoln Kaye, dated August 8, 1985, p. 24.

6. SOCIAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

6.1 The food situation

In January 1984 the AFP reports on a worsening of the food supplies, which were already delicate as a result of the fighting flaring up. The army operations had completely disorganised the food supplies. On account of this situation Mgr. Belo is reported to have written a confidential letter to the authorities in Jakarta by the end of December, in which he carefully expressed his concern about the food shortage. 1)
The International Red Cross did not have access to the islands of East Timor at the time, so that the truth of these reports could not be verified. In reports from FRETILIN about the situation in the eastern part, the bad food supplies were confirmed for the second half of 1984 for 6 places which were named. 2)

By the end of May/beginning of June 1985 the Red Cross visits the islands of East Timor for the first time since July 1983 3), where they visit 25 villages 5) (chosen because of their isolated situation, climate and former experiences in connection with the food supplies) in nine sub-districts, and investigate the food-situation, on malnutrition as well as food stocks. 4) In general the food situation seemed to be reasonably satisfactory; three villages (Iliomar, Luro 5) and Raifusa) occurred not to be self supporting on food. This experience was a reason for the ICRC to find 'emergency assistance' not necessary.

Does this mean that the former reports on food shortage have been incorrect? In our point of view this is not necessarily the case. The most important sowing months for corn (the main food on East Timor) are November and December. 6)
As a result of the military situation by the end of 1983 the sowing was put in a fix. The gloomy prospects which stemmed from that have been the basis for the

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1) AFP/ANP, dated January 8, 1984, no. 131708, January 1984.

2) Tapol, March 1985, pp. 7-18.

3) Except a visit in September 1984 to three detention centres.

4) See ICRC, report no. 15, pp. 3 and further.

5) Only Luro is also mentioned by FRETILIN by name; the other 5 villages were different ones than those visited by the ICRC, although some lie reaonably close to the villages visited by the ICRC.

6) J.K. Metzner, Man and Environment in Eastern Timor, pp. 204-210.

alarming messages in the beginning of 1984. This subsequently has led to food shortages in 1984 as from March (just before harvest).
By the end of 1984 (when the military situation was relatively quiet) the next sowing cycle starts, with harvest as from March 1985. These have apparantly gone very well and were the basis for the findings of the ICRC.

That there have been food shortages to a certain extent seems plausible when we take a closer look at the possible causes: in relation to similar shortages in 1982 (see page 3) a religious prior named the following facts as the most important causes:

- "Often the people can't get to their fields or the forests either to plant food or to gather it ... (villages) are immobilised so that no one can come or go without strict scrutinity ...
- People can't get to their fields either because they are too lethargic or sick from malnutrition, or too weak and tired because they are forced to stay up all night keeping guard ... They are also forced to provide 'voluntary' assistance in the Indonesian government development projects ...
- Their fields are too far away ...
- In addition shortages of water-buffalo and other stock to plough the fields ...
- They cannot guarantee that if they go to the fields, they will not be accused of association with FRETILIN ...". 1)

Two years later (January 1985) Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council sum up a number of the same problems in relation to the situation in 1984:

- "Concentration des populations dans des camps en conditions inhumaines, sans possibilité de s'alimenter elles-mêmes en cultivant leur terres ...
- Recrutement des éléments valides de la population retirés des tâches habituelles et orientées vers les opérations militaires.
- Service obligatoire des veilles de nuit réalisé dans des conditions inhumaines ...
- 'Gotong royong' (mutual help) programmé et executé sans considerer les besoins de la population". 2)

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1) Asia Partnership for Human Development, July/August 1983, Newsletter 22, p. 3.

2) Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique er du Conseil Presbytérial du diocèse de Dili, January 1, 1985, p. 5.

Also from other sources it is known that the food shortage in Los Palos and surroundings is of a permanent nature as a result of the limited freedom (FRETILIN is traditionally very active there).
Summarizing it can be said that it is plausible that as a result of the military operations the food situation in 1983 and 1984 worsened and led to shortages in several places, without taking on such a dramatical extent as it did in the past, and that subsequently the food situation improved fairly quickly.

6.2 The International Red Cross

In relation to the International Red Cross there are various categories of aid: 'protection', 'tracing' and 'medical relief'.
The 'tracing' (tracing, repatriation and uniting of separated members of families) and the 'medical relief' for Atauro have never come across serious problems. This is not the same for the other activities.

Medical relief programme for the mainland

In July 1983 the ICRC postponed its participation to the aid on: "being unable to apply usual International Red Cross criteria for the provision of aid". 1)
It adds to this: "ICRC is prepared to resume its assistance on the main island at any time, provided that its delegates are granted acces to all persons requiring such aid".
According to the reports of the ICRC this situation remained the same till January 1985. 2) At the yearly pressconference of the ICRC on January 10, 1985, it was still said that "as for East Timor, president deplored difficulties for ICRC-action".
Only in February and March 1985 the ICRC and Indonesia reached a new agreement which led to a 'preliminary survey' in order to be able to determine the food situation by the end of May, beginning of June 1985 (see page 23).

Although the above information is accessable to anyone in the public reports of the Red Cross, this did not deter Indonesia to present a 'slightly' different version before the international human rights forums.

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1) ICRC report no. 10, p. 2.

2) See ICRC reports nos. 11 p. 5, 15 p. 5, 13 p. 5 respectively.

The decision of the ICRC was put in connection with FRETILIN in a very creative manner:

"In the latter part of 1983, it (ICRC) suspended a part of its protection and relief activities due to a temporary relapse in security conditions in the eastern part of the island, after (1) elements of ex-FRETILIN perpetrated a massacre against personnel of an Army engineering unit". (2)

In view of further aid it was said:

"In December 1983 an agreement was reached between the Indonesian Government and the ICRC whereby such assistance would henceforth be provided by the Indonesian Red Cross ... thus it was not a case of unilateral suspension by one party or the other. Reports on this matter have often been confusing and sometimes even misleading (sic)."

In fact, Indonesia cleverly used the fact that the ICRC, in view of its a-political neutral status, would never contradict the Indonesian statement in public.

Protection

These activities have been mentioned before, see page 14, so that this will only be a summary.

In October 1975, when FRETILIN controlled de facto East Timor, the Red Cross had acces to all prisioners. (3) After the Indonesian landing the Red Cross, for the first time, was given limited acces in February and November 1982. Thereafter the activities were suspended till March 1984 at the request of the Indonesian authorities. Since then the visits to prisons take place again, at first in 4 fases, at the moment in 3 fases per year "on a step-by-syep basis, extending them gradually to all detention centres".

Which number of prisons the ICRC is allowed to visit at the moment is not clear. Whether the protection activities of the ICRC form an actual guarantee for the well-being of the prisoners is in our opinion very doubtful (see page 15).

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1) The decision of the ICRC was taken in July 1983, the massacre took place in August 1983.

2) Statement by Ambassador A. Atalas, observer delegation of the Republic of Indonesia to the 41st session of the Commission of Human Rights, Geneva, February 20, 1985, p. 7.

3) See ICRC report no. 2, p. 2; underlining editor.

6.3 Improvement of the standard of living

From information of the Indonesian government itself as well as from reports of foreign visitors to East Timor, it shows that Indonesia tries to push the development of East Timot (see also page 41). In this context it is useful - in order to form a balanced opinion - to recall beforehand a remark by Amnesty International:

"Amnesty International has noted that the Indonesian Government has stated that the human rights situation in East Timor is improving, and that in support of this officials have made frequent references to programmes of socio-economic development in East Timor. This is, however, not relevant to the particular concerns Amnesty has addressed (see par. 5.1), about which no substantive response has been given." 1)

In the end all figures on money put into certain development-projects come from the Indonesian government itself, be it directly, be it through visitors who invoke the Indonesian Officials. These figures show a strong upward trend and are considerably higher for East Timor than for other Indonesian provinces. However, there are reasons to handle the published figures (certainly those in the press, but also those in Indonesian government publications) with the utmost care:

- The numbers are sometimes very diverse. In July 1983 there are 76 Timorese students with a scholarship for a study elsewhere in Indonesia. In February 1985 there are already 400 and in July 1985 it amounts to 713. 2) The number of literary people increased through the Indonesian efforts from 15% under Portuguese rule to 35% in 1985; or from 8% to 40%, or - at choice - from 8% to 60%. 3)
- The production of rice was in 1980 22.537 tons (being an increase of 41% compared to 1979); in 1984 the rice produce is, according to one source, only 20.000 tons or, according to another source, 35.000 tons (even this 35.000 tons is, in comparison to 1979/1980 and the potential 4) of East Timor, a

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1) Amnesty International statement on East Timor to the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization, dated August 8, 1985.

2) See East Timor after Integration, p. 132, statement by Mr. Nana S. Sutresna, Geneva, dated March 1985; and F.E.E.R., M. Carrascalaô quoting, August 8, 1985, respectively.

3) Statement by mr. Nana Sutresna, Geneva, dated March 1, 1985; F.E.E.R., dated August 8, 1985, p. 21; Herald Tribune, dated July 20, 1985, respectively.

4) Compare 20.482 hectares padi fields in 1980 (East Timor after Integration, p. 116) to the planned 146.000 hectares (F.E.E.R. August 8, 1985, p. 22).

very small increase). 1)

The maize produce in 1985 is either 45.300 tons or 33.000 tons (nearly 30% less), while this would have been around 70.000 tons in 1982. 2)

- There are indications that not all projects planned are being executed: "The programmes or aid projects to orphans, unemployed, the least favoured by society, have never been executed ... In truth ... these projects remain paper projects without concrete realisation". 3)

  Barberra Crosetta reports that every village has a para-medic; "inefficacité de l'assistance sanitaire ... contre diverse maladies surtout endémiques". 4)
- Other projects would be carried out very badly:

  "The 101 teachers for catechesis appointed on Timor (which Indonesia mentions; author) have in reality been appointed on Java and sent to Timor. They are mostly Javanese who cannot find work at Java and who try to establish themselves on Timor ... even the children make fools out of them and know that they are not genuine teachers." 5)

On regarding 'family planning' (Keluarga berencana) Mgr. Belo remarks: "It is necessary to distinguish between two things: the three Keluarga berencana that is 'dissimilated', which is carried out by the agents in the villages ... The Keluarga berencana that, as we know is being practiced in Timor, consists simply of distributing pills to ignorant people, or to give injections to unaware women ...". 6)

Whatever the case may be, it does look like the Indonesian government strives to push the development of East Timor. Some interpret this in a very radical way: "New roads and other facilities are designed for military and commercial purposes and are only secondarily concerned with the well-being of the local

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1) East Timor after Integration, p. 116; The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 7 '8), 1985, p. 5; Asiaweek, August 2, 1095, p. 32, respectively.

2) The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 7(8), 1985, p. 5; Asiaweek, August 2, 1985, p. 32; 70.000 tons was calculated based upon the area in 1982 (East Timor after Integration, p. 116) and the production of 1 ton/hectare (see Asian Wall Street Journal, March 7(8), 1985, p. 5.).

3) Tomada de Posicao o documento,"Religious life in East Timor", May 20, 1985, p.6.

4) Barbara Crosette, Herald Tribune, July 20(21), 1985. Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique et du Conseil Presbytéral du diocèse de DIli, dated January 1985, p. 4, respectively.

5) Tomada de Posiçao perante o documento "Religious life in East Timor", May 20, 1995, p. 4.

6) Keluarga Berencana, responsible parenthood, 2nd Pastoral letter. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, dated March 3, 1985, p. 6.

population - if at all." 1)

Whether this is correct or not Justice and Peace cannot determine. However, it is true that for Indonesia this works both ways: next to starting the process of a socio-economic development, it offers Indonesia a powerful instrument for:

- A 'divide and rule'-policy, Within the Timorese church for instance it puts individual priests in a dilemma whether or not to concede to the Indonesian authorities (with all possible material advantages). For instance in the liturgy a mass was developed in Tetum. Not all priests go along with this. "The main reason, however, to give in to the use of the Indonesian language seems to please the occupants in view of a promise of money ...". 2) Also Mgr. belo refers to this dilemma. 3)
- The 'Indonesianising' of Timor. Here, important place is taken by the schools, where everything goes the Indonesian way. 4) "Essayer d'indonesianiser' le peuple timorais au travers de fortes campagnes de 'Pancasila', d'écoles, de moyens de communication sociale, aliénant sa 'Weltanschauung', c'est assassiner progressivement la culture timoraise", according to Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council. 5)

In conclusion it can be said that the information presented by the Indonesian government point in the direction of a - socio-economically viewed - speeded up development of East Timor, but that independant thorough evaluations do not exist. Besides there are critical voices within the Timorese society which conjure up doubts as to whether and in to what extent this speeded development benefits the Timorese population.

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1) Recalling Timor's forgotten voices, Mgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes, The Asian Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1985.

2) Tomado de Posiçao de um cristao Timorense frente à situaçao de guerre em Timor-Leste, February 10, 1985, p. 2.

3) Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique et le Conseil Presbytéral du diocèse de Dili, dated January 1, 1985, p. 6.

4) Tomado de Posiçao perante o documento "Religious life in East Timor', May 20, 1985, p. 4.

5) Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique et du Conseil Presbytéral du diocèse de Dili, dated January 1, 1985, p. 6.

7. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN EAST TIMOR

7.1 The position of Mgr. Filipe Ximenes Belo

In May 1983 Mgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes resigned his position as Apostolic Administrator and he was succeeded by Mgr. Filipe Ximenes Belo, a 35 year old Salesian. This change of position called for a number of reactions, like the refusal, as a protest, of the Timorese priests to attend the ceremonial inauguration of Mgr. Belo, and the letter sent before the appointment of 180 Timorese Roman Catholics to Pope John Paul II requesting that Mgr. Lopes stay on as Apostolic Administrator.
Besides that the appointment conjured up numerous questions: why this change of position, why the appointment of Mgr. Belo, but most of all the question which stand will Mgr. Belo take against the Indonesian rule in East Timor, for at the time he was known as a more moderate person.
We shall try to answer this question by giving a chronological list of the most important events. In this it will be shown that Mgr. Belo more or less continued the lines of Mgr. Lopes and according to our opinion, even brought forward more clearly the demand for self-determination as an important element in a possible solution of the conflict (see page 33).

According to the AFP, Mgr. Belo was supposed to have written a confidential letter to the Indonesian authorities in December 1983 in relation to the worsening food situation - as a result of operation Persatuan. On top of that he is reported to have condemned the arrest and the violence in East Timor in a sermon followed by reprimands by the local office for religious affairs (Kantor Agama, see further on page 38). 1)

In February 1984 Mgr. Belo wrote a letter to Mgr. Lopes, in which he extensively goes into the arrests, disappearances and executions with reference to the military operation. 2) He requests Mgr. Lopes in this letter "to continue to pray for us, and make an appeal to the free world to open its eyes to the barbarities of which the Indonesians are capable." The authenticity of this letter was

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1) Press release AFP/ANP dated January 8, 1984, no. 131708, January 1984.

2) Letter dated February 16, 1984, telex Press P.M. 18346, 2118 Gibbon G. from Mgr. Belo to Mgr. Lopes.

queried by Indonesia before the UN Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. (1) The value of this statement, however, must be strongly doubted, since Indonesia, at the occasion of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights session in February 1985, in a reaction to the interviews given by Mgr. Belo in July 1984 in Jakarta (see below), without any further comment issued a summary of a contra-interview by the Jakarta Post with Mgr. Belo, in which he says:
"Some parts of my personal letter were released publicly. That letter was not meant to be released as a public statement ... Besides the main elements ... were not unknown to the Indonesian authorities." (2)

On the occasion of the celebrations of the 450th anniversary of the Indonesian Catholic Church, Mgr. Belo stayed in Jakarta, where he was interviewed by various reporters. The most extensive interview was published in the Australian magazine The Age, on July 16, 1984. A novelty is the criticism which Mgr. Belo gives on FRETILIN:
"He told 'The Age' that the violent methods used by FRETILIN were wrong and had caused suffering to their own people".
Sharper comments of Mgr. Belo were quoted by The West Australian:
"They make enemies of the people, they have killed a few villagers, burnt houses, threatened people. This is to provoke the Indonesians and divert troops. It also intimidates people into giving them food and help." (3)

These words were being quoted by Indonesia before the U.N. Commission for Human Rights (4), passing by the differentiation of Mgr. Belo and all his criticism on the part of Indonesia in these interviews.
Mgr. Belo differentiated his remarks before the AFP by linking it to the Indonesian violence: both parties have dirtied their hands in this respect, but the Indonesian army is far more guilty of this. (5)

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(1) Statement by Mgr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti, observer of the Republic Indonesia to the 37th session of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Geneva, August 23, 1984, p. 3.

(2) Excerpts of the interview of Jakarta Post, August 24, 1984, Situation in East Timor is improving, issued dated February 2, 1985, Geneva.

(3) The West Australian, July 31, 1984.

(4) Indonesia quotes these remarks as they appear in The Age, dated July 31, 1984, Statement by Ambassador A. Atalas, observer delegation of the Republic Indonesia to the 41st session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, February 20, 1985, p. 5.

(5) AFP/ANP dated July 26, 1984, no. 261135.

In The Age and the AFP he continually pointed at the terror practiced by the Indonesian army, the numerous violations of the human rights, killings, 'military abuses', repraisals and detentions without charges which were committed by the Indonesian army. In the end, Mgr. Belo says, it is the Timorese population "who suffer from the Indonesian side and from the FRETILIN side" (The Age), who are being "terrorised" by the new colonists from Java (AFP), and "have become second-rate citizens because of the arrival of people from Java and Sulawesi" (AFP).

As a first step to a solution of the conflict Mgr. Belo sees a cease-fire, retreat of the military reinforcement which arrives since August 1984, and resumption of the negotiations (AFP).

Indonesia, shocked by this publicity, organised a meeting of some Indonesian reporters of amongst others the Jakarta Post and Tempo with Mgr. Belo, hoping to get some 'contra-interviews' this way. On the surface these interviews breathe a different atmosphere. Possibly this can be retraced to self-censorship, partly a result of the pressure under which Mgr. Belo by that time must have been after his first interviews. In this way Mgr. Belo said to the AFP to have been reprimanded by the army several times and to The Age: "I am ready to be removed if that is the price of defending human rights and the rights of the Timorese. The truth should be published.".

More important, however, is that the - otherwise fairly vague - interviews did not deny or contradict former statements. On the contrary, they even partly affirm certain remarks, be it in friendlier terms: There are no "major problems" according to the Jakarta Post, but there are "shortenings" like "the restrictions of movement". Tempo calls this "things lacking". 1) In The Age Mgr. Belo said on this:"The Timorese want peace and liberty, but at present the whole of East Timor is like a prison". And on the steps to be taken Mgr. Belo said (like in The Age, see above): "I think there should be talks with FRETILIN again ... I am willing to act as an intermediary".

Besides interviews also the direct correspondence of Mgr. Belo with amongst others catholic organisations and Bishops' Conferences, is a source of information. Mgr. Belo was most pronounced on the direction of a possible solution, in a letter to Justice and Peace in France: "Despite all forces against us, we continue to hold and disseminate that the only solution ... should include ...

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1) Excerpts of the interview of Jakarta Post, August 24, 1984, Situation in East Timor is improving, issued dated February 8, 1985, Geneva; Tempo extracts published in Tapol, september 1984, p. 15.

the respect for the right of a people for self-determination. 1)
Also in the message of Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council, published on January 1, 1985, this element reappeared (see page 35). A new theme that Mgr. Belo puts forward in his correspondence is the "respect for the cultural, ethnic and religious identity of a people", which was named by the Pope in July 1984 as a special point for concern and attention. 2)
In answer to the presentation of the credentials by the new Indonesian Ambassador to the Vatican, the Pope said:
"You know with what attention the Holy See views this very delicate problem (East Timor, author's note) ... The Holy See continues to follow the situation with preoccupation and with hope that particular consideration will be given in every circumstance to the ethnic, religious and cultural identity of the people". 3)
This point was only concretely worked out by Mgr, Belo in his message of January 1, 1985 (see page 34). Seeing that this message was the most complete and pronounced attitude of the Timorese Church of the last few years, we were of the opinion that we should devote a separate paragraph to this message.

Finally, how much importance Mgr. Belo attaches to new negotiations between FRETILIN and Indonesia, shows again from his remarks during his visit to the Pope in Rome in July 1985, a visis in which he carefully avoided contacts with reporters as much as possible. Mgr. Belo says just before resuming the return journey after having been in Rome for 45 days "to try to launch new negotiations between FRETILIN and Indonesia". 4)

7.2 The message of the Apostolic Administrator and the Presbyterian Council of the Diocese Dili of January 1, 1985

This document is, true enough not (exclusively) written by Mgr. Belo but it does bear his signature. The authenticity of it was quickly brought up for discussion by Indonesia. Indonesia published a telex which would have been sent by Mgr. Belo to the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

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1) Correspondence dated December 5, 1984, between Mgr. Belo and Justice and Peace, France.

2) See ibidem, and correspondence dated December 4, 1984, between Mgr. Belo and the Dutch Bishop's Conference.

3) Osservatore Romana, dated July 8, 1984.

4) AFP, Jaques Guillon, dated August 8, 1985, HK 080249.

"It is notified that the Bishop of Dili has never written the document of January 1st, 1985". The American Department of State regards the document therefore as a 'fabrication". (1)

By now three independant sources have, however, confirmed the authenticity of the document. (2) Two sources have specially informed Justice and Peace how they have come to this conclusion, on the ground of first hand information. (3)

According to Indonesia reports, Mgr. Belo signed the telex in question as well as the Januar 1 document. To add to this it has been observed that Mgr. Belo - who seems to like allusions - only denied in the telex that he wrote the document. As far as we know this is correct, he would only have written part of it.

In the document the Presbyterian Council (college of all priest of the diocese) in co-operation with Mgr. Belo, formulates a number of starting points for the benefit of talks which would have to take place between the Indonesian government and the Timorese church. (4)

The central line of approach which has been chosen is the theme which the Pope emphasized when the new Indonesian Ambassador to the Holy See presented his credentials: the ethnic, religious and cultural identity of the population of East Timor.

As a matter of introduction the authors formulate some more general starting points. The document is based upon the idea that:

"Nous devons donc avoir le courage d'aller à la racine de tous ces maux (which the Timorese population have experienced to this day; editorial note) ... Nous ne pourons construire l'avenir sur un présent miné, pas des erreurs passées. Nous devons avoir le courage d'analyser ces erreurs passées ...".

- As an importent Right of the Nation they acknowledge that "aucune peuple n'admets d'être gouverné par un autre. Seul les respects effectifs de ces droits légitime un régime". Violations of the human rights, according to the church, are closely connected with the above mentioned right.

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1) Letter to Mr. Hall, June 6, 1985.

2) East Timor Report no. 10, p. 2; Communiqué de presse, dated August 26, 1985, Geneva, by Pax Christi International and Pax Romana; Indonesia reports June LOG no. 9, July 1985, p. 7.

3) Being East Timor Report, Pax Christi International; unfortunately in a publication like this one, detailed information cannot be given.

4) Em Timor Leste, a Paz é Possível , no. 11., p. 1.

- On the armed conflict the authors state: "Ce conflict dont on prétend faire croire qu'il était une guerre fratricide, n'était en realité qu'une des parties engagées dans cette guerre face à une armée régulière, l'armée du gouvernement indonésien ...". And further "Après neuf ans d'occupation ... la guerre continue et en proportions toujours croissantes avec débarquement continuel de troupes indonésiennes et de matériel de guerre lourd ...".
- Finally reference is made to the theme of self-determination (Right of the Nation) and the question arises: "Tous cela sera-t-il seulement la manifestation d'un groupe ou d'une minorité obstinée (being FRETILIN; author's note), ou révèlera-t-il quelque chose de plus profond sur l'exigence d'un peuple à ses droits fondamentaux?".

  Emphatically they reject the idea of Indonesia that self-determination would already have been exercised.

Then follows a review on the ethnic, religious and cultural situation: "Nous assistons à Timor à une convulsion de proportions gigantesque et tragiques dans le tissu socio-culturel du peuple timorais que nous voyons menacer de mort l'identité de ce peuple" and "l'Eglise ne peut pas ne pas condamner les injustices et les attaques à la dignité de l'homme."

- The ethnic identity is threatened by "successives opérations de nettoyage, systématiques et périodiques", "une tension permanente de représailles avec fusillement d'hommes et de jeunes", "mobilisation de mineurs pour participer aux opérations militaires", "vagues d'emprisonnements", "inefficacité de l'assistance sanitaire aux populations", "concentration des populations dans des camps en conditions inhumaines", "recrutement des éléments valides", "service obligatoire des veilles de nuit", "occupation systématique des postes clés dans les services publics par élements indonésiens" and "Gotong Royong programmé et executé sans considérer les besoins de la population".
- On account of the religious identity the document stated: "Ne pas respecter la tradition religieuse, même animiste, est détruire la croyance d'un peuple" and "en accusant les prêtres, arrêtant les cathéchistes et déportant et tuant les chrétiens, on essaye de détruire la religiosité."
- On the cultural identity it says: "Essayer d'indonésianiser le peuple timorais au travers de fortes campagnes de 'Pancasila', 'écoles, de moyens de communication sociale, aliénant sa 'Weltanschauung' c'est assassiner progressivement la culture timoraise".

The document ends with the powerful call to respect the fundamental human rights and the ethnic, religious and cultural identity, and to create conditions for a fruitful dialogue "entre toutes les parties intéressées", a clear hint to résolution 37/70 of the U.N. In contrast to this somewhat vague resolution, the authors do specify this formula (see paragraph on U.N., page54) "en particulier le peuple de Timor, universellement représenté par les mouvements actifs soit à l'intérieur du territoire soit à l'extérieur", by which certainly also FRETILIN is indicated as a serious party to the discussions.

With this document the Timorese church, in continuity with the formulation of Pope John Paul II, has in a very pronounced way taken a stand on the situation in East Timor. In contradiction to the negotiations within U.N. context between Portugal and Indonesia, Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council did not put the theme of ethnic, religious and cultural identity in a sterile academic context, but connect it in a realistic way with the actual situation, through which it gets a useful meaning.

7.3 Further aspects

On the number of catholics there is some uncertainty. The confusion on this is being facilitated because there is no difference between the baptized and those who have themselves registered as a catholic with the authorities. "Religious Life", an Indonesian government document, written in connection with the talks on religious liberty within the U.N. negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal, quotes the number 447.390 catholics in 1984. M. Carrascalaô, the governor, notes an increase of 460.000 in 1980 to over 500.000 in 1985, according to AFP. The document of January 1, 1985, states nearly 400.000. 1)
Whatever the case may be, there is a considerable growth in the number of catholics. As a result the already existing shortage of priests has further increased through this. For that matter there is also some discord: M. Carrascalaô stated the number of 46 priests for East Timor, "Religious Life" stated 36 (of which 9 from Indonesia), Mgr. Belo stated 36. 2) With this the number

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1) Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the U.N., Religious Life in East Timor, AFP. Jacques Guillon, dated July 1985; Message de l'administrateur Apostolique et du Conseil Presbytéral du diocèse de Dili, January 1, 1985, respectively.

2) Ibidem, p. 3. Interview of Mgr. Belo with Jakarta Post, excerpts, Situation in East Timor is improving, spread on February 8, 1985, Geneva, p. 1., respectively.

of priests per 10.000 catholics in comparison with the beginning of the seventies, has been reduced by now to approximately 1 per 10.000 (the lowest number for all Asia, for all of Indonesia the number is 5 per 10.000.) 1) The number of foreign priests that has been admitted is very small, so that there is some talk of a "creeping 'Indonesianisation' of the priesthood as the local church has had to turn increasingly to the rest of the archipelago to recruit priests and train its own novices". 2)
This 'Indonesianisation', forced through a shortage of personnel, causes inevitable tensions. Not all Indonesian priests and nuns are sufficiently aware of their precarious position: "In this way, for instance, a 'nun' went to visit a detention centre for political prisoners. There she sought contact with a prisoner and offered him money to serve as an informer against other prisoners". 3)
Also by appealing on the shortage of money the Timorese church is being forced to 'indonisianize': "... every effort has been used to make a mass in Tetum and it has already been officially approved ... That some priests read mass in a foreign (read: Indonesian; author's note) language ... is a lack of character ... The main reason, however, to yield to the use of the Indonesian language, seems to please the occupiers, in view of the money of which in this time there is a true shortage." 4)

Thus the Timorese church is put in a dilemma: how far can one go in one's co-operation with the Indonesian government without straining their own task and identity? "When it is said that they are after honest co-operation and not cringing it is setting out with the devil. These days even the so-called 'collaborators' in East Timor do not co-operate on an honest base. They need money, it is a question of survival. When priests are willing to co-operate in order to bring the Maubere (= Timorese) people by means of 'Integration to Independance', they credit themselves with a right that is not due to them ..." 5)
And "The church of Timor is put in a dilemma: either take a brave stand in order to defend the faith and the catholic traditions of the Timorese people and fight for the respect of the human rights and social justice, or co-operate with the Indonesian government, and hold out the hand to the hangmen, who destroyes the ethnic, cultural and religious identity of the people. 6)

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1) Pro Mundi Vita, Facts and figures on the Catholic Church in Asie 2-3/1984
2) F.E.E.R., dated August 8, 1985, p. 22.
3) Tomada de posiçao de um cristao timorense frente a situaçao de guerre em Timor-Leste, February 28, 1985, p. 2.
4) Ibidem, p. 2
5) Ibidem, p. 2
6) Tomada de posiçao perante o documento "Religious Life in East Timor", May 20, 1985, p. 2.

Next to this indirect pressure on the Timorese church through finances and personnel, there is also an open check on the church: "The government of Indonesia practices a considerable pressure on Mgr. Belo. His sermons and pastoral visits to the groups of christians in the inland are being monitored by soldiers. There are soldiers disguised as pious christians who attend religious celebrations in order to spy and to hear what monseigneur and other priests say.

It is impossible to speak openly about the problems that affect the social and religious life of the Timorese people. There are spies everywhere. The military and civil authorities do not permit the apostolic administrator and the priests to direct their sermons to the theme of 'suffering and pain'. The smallest reference to suffering that is directly or indirectly connected to the situation is being regarded as anti-Pancasila or anti-Indonesian". 1) Sometimes statements are more open: "The church is persecuted and accused ... The residence of the Salesian Father in Bacay was 'savagely' searched by the nangalas". 2) In direct as well as indirect checks, according to certain reports, the Kantor Agama, the local department for religious affairs, would play an important part by controlling certain finances and by organising Pancasila 'information programmes' for the clergy.

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1) Ibidem, p. 3.

2) Letter of Mgr. Belo to Mgr. Lopes, dated February 16, 1984, telex Press P.M. 18346,21118, Gibbon G.

8. THE REPORTING ON EAST TIMOR

8.1 Foreign visits to East Timor

Visits to East Timor by diplomats or reporters play an important role in the information on Timor, as well as because of their fairly large influence on the process of political decision making in international forums (for instance the U.N. Human Rights Commission, see page 50).
Justice and Peace has always pleaded for complete opening up of East Timor and will keep on doing so. Nevertheless there are some disadvantages attached to visits and the way in which others make use of them, which we will discuss hereafter.

In July 1983 the Australian parliamentary delegation under the leadership of Bill Morrison, visited East Timor. Shortly after that the military activities increase in fierceness, and except a visit of the Australian Ambassador in Indonesia Dalrymple in July 1984, no visitors were admitted till the end of the military operations. As from October 1984 the first visits by diplomats started again, and between October 1984 and April 1985 diplomats from eight different countries (Great Britain, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Venezuela, Nigeria, France and Japan) visit East Timor. In February for the first time a European parliamentary delegation, from West Germany, visits East Timor. At the beginning of March the first reporters were being admitted again since July 1983 (from Reuter, Asian Wall Street Journal and Associated Press). In the beginning of July reporters of the New York Times, the Far Eastern Economic Review, Asiaweek and AFP were admitted. In August the Dutch Ambassador, at the request of Portugal, traveled around in East Timor.
On all these visits applies the fact that they are of fairly short duration and all were characterized by a more or less 'guided character'.

Although in itself it is something positive when East Timor can be visited by foreigners, it is necessary to have a critical look upon these visits. In this we restrict ourselves mainly to the journalists and parliamentary delegations, since Justice and Peace has good reasons to query seriously the nature and level of some diplomatic visits. The observations of US-diplomats which visit East Timor are partly reflected in the yearly so-called Country Reports on Human Right Practices. A special paragraph will be dedicated to these reports.

- The relatively high number of reporters who have visited East Timor in 1985 would perhaps make us forget that Indonesia makes a scrupulous selection before allowing a visit. For example AAP, the only Australian media-group which is allowed to operate in Indonesia, was refused acces to East Timor, because "(Australian journalists) tend to be oversensitive". 1)
- Also the time of the visit is of great importance. Indonesia makes sure that the visits coincide as much as possible with relatively quiet periods without large military operations (compare with the afore mentioned chronological list). In our opinion it is no coincidence that the visit of Dalrymple, which was the only one to take place during a turbulent period, had first been postponed, then cancelled and finally belatedly took place under such strict conditions that Dalrymple formally protested to the authorities that the visit was 'too narrow'. 2)
- Amnesty International makes some critical remarks in its report of 1985 which can be called to mind here: 3)
  - . Interpreters occur to have been instructed by the Indonesian authorities, not to translate complaints or unfavourable information. It occurs from tapes, that during the unexpected meeting between the Australian parliamentary delegation and the FRETILIN, the interpreter, who had been put at their disposal by Indonesia, translated wrongly on crucial points.
  - . Military material is, in preparation of the visits, removed from public places. Jones of the Asian Wall Street Journal (March visit) confirms this practice: "A priest in one village says that two armoured troop-cariers that usually rumble roads have been hidden from view". 4)
  - . Critical elements, according to Amnesty, are being shut op if necessary by detention during the visit. Mgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes can confirm this practice from his own experience: "I had been warned by Indonesian officials of the consequences to the clergy in my diocese if I spoke out". 5)
  - . In February 1979 as well as in November 1982, prisoners were brought to police barracks, according to Amnesty, when visits of the Red Cross were being expected. 6) This practice was also confirmed by others, for instance during the visit of the Nuncio in June 1981. 7)

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1) East Timor Report no. 10, p. 5
2) Canberra Times, July 9, 1984
3) See Amnesty International, East Timor violations of human rights, 1985, p.16
4) The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1985, p. 6
5) The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, May 20, 1985, p.14
6) Amnesty International, op.cit. p.64
7) Em Timor Leste a Paz é Possível, no. 12, p. 6.

- Often the reports of the journalists contain a number of doubtful generalisations (for instance see below the generalisation of the New York Times on the political prisoners). Only few give evidence of being aware of this, like Jones who honestly writes: "Reporters flitting from place to place by helicopters are unable to gauge accurately the level of fighting". 1) Mgr. Lopes adds in a comment: "The same of course, could be said for the level of human rights violations, as well as conditions in parts of the territory that were not visited". 2)
- The visits often appear to have a large political value. It was not a coincidence that Dalrymple's visit took place just before the important conference of the Australian Labor Party in Australia. It was not coincidental that the visit of March 1985 coincided with the U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting, so that the Indonesian delegation was able to say: "They have freedom to travel and visit places they want to see ... It is important to note that their initial comments and impressions are indeed positive". 3) Whether this is true is not important now, after all, it has already taken its effect as showed on the outcome of the meeting. Jones for instance writes on 'freedom to travel': "Although the journalists are aware that there is a military air-base near Bacau, our pilots fly out to sea, when we leave town, precluding even a glimpse of the airfield", and the conditions of the visit are called "strictly monitored". 4)

  Reuter is not exactly 'positive' when it reports: "The head of the catholic church in East Timor has accused the Indonesian military of executing 84 men, women and children during a security operation in 1983 ... I saw the graves ..." he said. 5)
- Indonesia directly uses these visits to present its vision, for instance concerning the socio-economic development: "Bureaucrats overwhelm visitors with a blizzard of figures". 6)

  Before (page 27) we pointed at the many contradictions that occur in the journalist reports on this subject, in comparison with one another as well as in comparison with Indonesian government sources. It is a sad

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1) The Asian Wall Street Journal , March 5, 1985, p. 6
2) The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, May 20, 1985, p. 14

3) Statement by Mr. Nana Sutresna, representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the 41st session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, March 1, 1985, pp. 5-6.

4) The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1985, p. 6
5) Reuter, Peter Millership, March 1, 1985
6) F.E.E.R. dated August 8, 1985, p. 23

that journalists are not in the position to check figures with former reports of colleagues or public Indonesian government reports, moreover because these figures have taken on a life of its own. In this way the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague quotes the New York Times, as to paint a picture of the results in education, which announced an increase of the number of literary people from 8 to 60%, while Indonesia itself stated 9 months before to the Human Rights Commission that the number had mounted from 15 to 35%. 1)

- Finally, also the reports of journalists of the same visit differ sometimes remarkably in saliant places: The New York Times reports for instance" The countryside ... has been largely peaceful". The picture that the F.E.E.R. paints is far more shaded and it is written amongst others: "The picture they (priests; author's note) drew is of battles for more numerous, geographically widespread and bloodier than the government admits. They tell of FRETILIN detachments, 30-strong or more, roaming the countryside at will in the night. In some places ... as close as 45 km from Dili". 2) On the strength of FRETILIN the N.Y.T. reports: "The front is loosely organized, according to most reports, and is thought to have between 500 and 1000 guerrillas supported by about 2000 family members".

  The F.E.E.R. also reports this number, but points at the improbability of it in four places when they write: "The casualties seem high for a conflict as dormant as the East Timorese civil war is said to be".

  Asiaweek reports: "Independent estimates make it 500-1000 and 5000 (dependant families)". 3)

  On political prisoners the N.Y.T. writes: "The number ... has dropped sharply". The F.E.E.R. however writes: "No prisoners are held outside these two facilities, the governor says, though foreign reporters ran into what looked like a prisoner transport van, labelled 'Department of Detention' well to the west of Dili on a road to the mountainous interior". 4)

Against this background Mgr. Belos words deserve full attention: "The bishop said visits by diplomats and journalists ... were of little significance. Even if these people are independent, they cannot say the truth because they are

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1) The Question of East Timor, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, The Hague, received January 1986, p. 6.

2) New York Times, July 19, 1985; F.E.E.R. dated 818185, p.22 respectively.

3) Asiaweek dated August 2, 1985, p. 30

4) N.Y.T., July 19, 1985; F.E.E.R. dated August 8, 1985, p.25, respectively.

too closely guided to see the truth. I hope that visitors will come to Timor and be able to see other things than the things they (Indonesia) want them to see, that they will be able to go into villages to discuss freely with the population, and not always with the governor, the military chief and the bishop". 1)

The visit of the German parliamentary delegation takes its own place in our opinion, because of the part it played in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. That is why we devote a separate paragraph to it.

8.2 The visit of the German parliamentary delegation (February 1985)

A parliamentary delegation consisting of 5 men of the 'Deutsch-Asean Parlementariergruppe' visited Indonesia from February 9 to 24, 1985 and during this visit they also went to East Timor for some days.
It was the first European parliamentary delegation that visited East Timor since the annexation by Indonesia.
From the report, which consists of 6 pages, it is shown that the travels around Timor had a very limited character, as well in respect of geographical spreading as the people with whom they have been able to speak. "Trotz der ... gezeigten Bereitschaft .. musste wegen der unzureichenden Verkehrsinfrastruktur aus Zeitgründen von einer umfassenden Bereisung der Insel abgesehen werden. 2) Im Hinblick auf den beträchtlichen zusätzlichen Kostenaufwand konnte der Möglichkeit zu einem längeren informativen Rundflug auf zwei Hubschrauber zurückgreifen, nicht nähergetreten werden". In effect, as far as can be made out from the report, the delegation travelled around in East Timor for two days, being on February 19 a short ride around Dili, combined with a visit to a hospital in Dili, and a 2-hour visit per helicopter to Atauro; on February 20 a daytrip to the two villages Liquia (around 35 km west of Dili) and Maubara (around 100 km west of Dili), both situated on the coast. The report does not hold any information on the experiences in Maubara. In Liquia the delegation spoke to the president of the district council, on Atauro they tried "über den begleitenden sprachkundigen Botschaftsangehörigen mit den Internierten in Anwesendheid Indonesischer Offiziere" to have a conversation, indeed with

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1) N.Y.T., July 19, 1985; F.E.E.R. dated August 8, 1985, p. 25, respectively.

2) Bericht über die Informationsreise einer Delegation der Deutsch-Asean Parlementariergruppe nach Indonesien vom 9. bis zum 24.Februar 1985, pp. 50-56.

varying succes. Finally the delegation had a conversation with the governor M. Carrascalaô. There is no mention in the report of any other important conversations which could have taken place.

In Liquica the delegation is treated by the president of the district council to "einen kurzen Referat mit demografischen und wirtschaftlichen Daten". He does not wish to comment on questions about the developments of the conflict in the past: "Ueber die genaue Zahl der Toten während des Bürgerkrieges wollte er sich nicht äussern ('Es geschah in den Bergen, während die Vertreter des Volks am Ort waren')." As positive changes the president named "die grösseren persönlichen Freiheiten in den verschiedenen Lebensbereichen sowie die Intensivierung der Kaffee- ... und der Holzwirtschaft." 1)

The report on the two-hour visit to Atauro has a fairly critical tone: "Vor der Abreise von Ost-Timor berichtete die Delegation dem Gouverneur von Ost-Timor ausführlich über die Erfahrungen des etwa zweistündigen Besuchs in Atauro. Sie verwies auf die schwerwiegenden Menschenrechtenverletzungen, die darin zu sehen seien, dass hier Menschen ohne jede Gerichtsverhandlung jahrelang festgehalten würden, deren vermeintliche Schuld darin bestehe dass sie Väter und Söhne hätten, die sich den Anschluss Ost-Timors an Indonesien widersetzen." 2) Other important conclusions than the above-mentioned the report does not hold.

Against this background it aroused great surprise to hear the West German representative in the U.N. Human Rights Commission state that "L'impression globale de ces parlementaires est que la situation dans le territoire c'est améliorée". With 'le territoire' can only be meant Dili, the 100 km long road to Maubara, and Atauro. 'Améliorée' cannot have any relation to Atauro, on which the delegation reflects fairly critically. It possibly refers to the impressions in Dili or Maubara (of which the report does not speak), or does it refer to the positive points of the president of the district council in Liquica?
Be as it may, the words of the representative of the German government, Mr. Höyinck, were not covered by the experiences of the German parlementary delegation, as stated in its report. This is all the more worrying now that this

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1) Berichte über die Informationsreise einer Delegation der Deutsch-Asean Parlementariergruppe nach Indonesien vom 9. bis zum 24. Februar 1985, p.52.

2) Ibidem, p. 52.

pronouncement, which was made during the confidential hearing within the so-called '1503-procedure', has played an important part in striking East Timor off the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights, in February 1985 (see page50).

8.3 The news service in American government reports on the development at East Timor

Seeing the importance others attach to the fairly extensive reports on East Timor in American government reports (see page 50) in the discussions in the international forums, a closer examination of these reports is worthwhile.1) There are some critical remarks on these reports to be made, and also there are some patent inaccuracies to be found in these reports:

- In relation to the work of the International Red Cross the Country Report for 1983 stated: "Many of the ICRC activities in East Timor were suspended in August after the security situation deteriorated ...". The same thing was stated in the updated Background Report in which some pages earlier, was said: "An unfortunate consequence of the resumption of sporadic fighting was government restriction on acces for some international organisations ..."2) The Red Cross, however, writes in her public reports: "Being unable to apply usual International Red Cross criteria ..., the ICRC decided in July 1983 to suspend its participation ...". 3)
  The suggestion that because of the hostilities, which would have been flared up again in August 1983 because of actions of FRETILIN, is being clearly contradicted.
- In relation to the military manuals which were ceased by FRETILIN by the end of 1982, the Country Report for 1983 reports: "There is no evidence of the authentcity of the document". On what grounds this is based is not indicated, but on top of that nowhere in the report it is indicated that Amnesty International did examine the autenthicity. "Both Amnesty International and experts on Indonesia have examined the documents and are satisfied that they are genuine on the basis of the military

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1) For practical reasons the examination remains restricted to the passages on East Timor from the Indonesian-section in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983, 1984 and an updated Department of State background report on East Timor dated July 25, 1984, with the accent on the last two reports.

2) Country Reports, 1983, p.785; Updated Background Report respectively.

3) Update on ICRC activities in East Timor, January 1 until October 15, 1983, p.2; underlining author.

terminology used, the size of the charts and diagrams included, the format and style, the official stamps and the detailed comprehension of military organizational structure and tactics." 1)

There are also some small irritating inaccuracies to be found:

- According to the updated background report, the Indonesian government spends: "annually ... more than 80 million on development and other programs in East Timor, more than six times as much as Portugal spent in 1974".2) S.Jones of The Asian Wall Street Journal reports that these 80 million are planned for the season 1985/86, with a budget for 1984/85 of 60 million. In 1983/84 still the budget, according to Indonesian statistics, was approximately $ 46 million, over half of the "annually spent 80 million". 3)
- The Country report for 1984 states for Atauro: "By the end of the year (1984; author's note), the Atauro island detention facility population dropped below one thousand, with the provincial government determined to return the remainder to their homes as soon as conditions allow." 4) According to the International Red Cross which has a nurse on Atauro on a semi-permanent basis, the number is by the end of 1984 1267; and even in April 1985 the number is still far above 1000, being 1271. 5)

The report contains a number of omissions which lead to a very inaccurate image:

- In the section 'Governmental Attitude Regarding International and non-Governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights' of the Country Report 1984, one complete paragraph, consisting of eleven lines, is devoted to the International Red Cross in East Timor. Not once anything is said about the still continuing difficulties between the Red Cross and Indonesia, which led in July 1983 to the one-sided suspension of the Red Cross aid (see page 6). 6)

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1) Written statement submitted by Amnesty International to the Commission on Human Rights, dated February 4, 1985, no.11, p.3.
In the Newsletter of Amnesty of September 1983,p.1, this was already reported.

2) Updated Background Report, p.3.

3) S.Jones, The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 7(8) 1985, p. 5, and East Timor after Integration, pp. 85-86, calculated with the given rate of exchange on the dollar, respectively.

4) Country Report for 1984, p. 771; underlining author.

5) ICRC East Timor report no.13, p.3, and ICRC East Timor report no.14, p.3 resp.

6) Country Report for 1984, p. 780.

In a section which aims at sketching the attitude of the government this is a crucial omission, certainly because the International Red Cross itself thought to summarize the words of its chairman on East Timor as: "as for East Timor, president deplored difficulties for ICRC-actions". 1)

- In the subsection 'Political killing' of the Country Report for 1984 East Timor is mentioned twice: first where it concerns the trial of FRETILIN-members on murder, arson or theft, then where it concerns actions of FRETILIN against government officials and the local population. 2) The numerous criticisms on the government of Indonesia are being completely ignored.
  For instance, Amnesty International reports two mass-executions before the Special Committee on Decolonization of the U.N. on 20-8-1984, one at Kraras after August 1983 and one at Hauba, where approximately 100 people would have been executed by the Indonesian troops in March 1984. 3) Where Mgr. Belo felt he had to put his criticism on FRETILIN in perspective before the AFP (both parties have dirtied their hands in this respect, but the Indonesian army is far more guilty of this) 4), this is an important omission which leads to a one-sided view.
- In the section 'Freedom of movement within the country, Foreign travel, Emigration and Repatriation' of the Country Report for 1984, East Timor is only mentioned concerning emigration.
  The freedom of movement in East Timor has been continuously strongly limited since the beginning of the Indonesian rule, especially in times of military operations like during the first half of 1984. For instance see the travel permit for April 1985, next to page 16. 5) Mgr. Belo mentioned the limited freedom of movement in several interviews in 1984 (see page 32).

Finally the reports contain a number of quotes based upon facts which leave room for various interpretations, without reporting other possible interpretations. Neither is the choice for one certain interpretation well reasoned.

- "No conclusive evidence has come to light to suggest torture is employed in these areas as a matter of policy", according to the Country Report for 1984. But even for 1984 Amnesty International reports torture. 6)

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1) Memo telex CH., 32375 NL, 22269 X CICR CH, annual press conference of president Alexandre Hay, dated January 10, 1985.

2) Country Report for 1984, p. 772-773.

3) Amnesty International, Statement on East Timor to the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization, August 20, 1984, p. 2.

4) AFP/ANP, 261135, July 1984.

5) See F.E.E.R., dated August 8, 2985, p. 22

6) Amnesty International, op.cit. p.3.

Before we referred to the military manuals. Indonesia has never denied the existence of these guidelines (see page 16). In the Country Report for 1983 the autenthicity of it is being doubted on insufficient grounds (as far as can be made out from the text, see page 17). These guidelines clearly point in another direction than the above mentioned sentence.

- On the trials which take place in Dili, the Country Report for 1984 writes: "Sentences for those convicted were relatively light", without any further explanation. International observers have not yet been admitted by the Indonesian government to these trials. The information which was issued by the Indonesian government on the trials (two lists with convicted and released respectively, given to the U.N.) is insufficient to justify the above mentioned statement. These lists contain no dates of arrest nor the exact charges against the defendant.

  "It is not known whether pre-trial detention, which at least in one case is believed to have been as long as eight years, was deducted from the sentences in accordance with the Indonesian Criminal Procedures Code." 1)

  In the case just mentioned it concerned Wenceslau de Carvalho, who was detained shortly after the invasion and sentenced to 7 years prison after having been in custody for 8 years prior to his trial.
- The updated background report states: "While there doubtless have been excesses by soldiers in the past, now local military officials exhibit greater sensitivity to human rights". 2) Involuntarily the question rises what this trust is based upon, when Amnesty states on the reaction of the Indonesian government:

  "Requests for information have been refused: acces to the territory by independant observers has been denied; no public investigations have been conducted into the many serious incidents which have been reported during this period. No safeguards have been publicly instituted or enforced which might prevent the reoccurrence of these violations; no charges have been brought against those responsible". 3)

Summarizing it can be put that the reports on East Timor in the American government reports, as far as we have seen them, contain a number of errors, inaccuracies and some important omissions. On some points the choices on the basis of multi-interpretable facts are not well-reasoned, at least as far as it is shown in the text.

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1) Amnesty International, statement on East Timor to the U.N. Special COmmittee on Decolonization, dated August 8, 1985, p.3.

2) Updated Background Report dated July 25, 1985, p. 5.

3) Amnesty International, statement on East Timor to the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization, dated August 8, 1985, p.5.

9. EAST TIMOR AND THE UNITED NATIONS

9.1 The Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations

The task of this Commission and its Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities is to promote the abiding by the human rights, while the more political aspects in connection with East Timor are being discussed by for instance the Special Committee on Decolonization of the General Assembly. From 1983 East Timor has been the subject-matter for discussion in the Human Rights Commission. As from 1984 the subject has been partly discussed behind closed doors within the confidential co-called 1503-procedure. In 1985 the Commission has decided, after the discussions on East Timor within the confidential procedure, on the grounds of the violations on human rights known to that date, not to discuss East Timor any further. Because this decision was taken behind closed doors, there has been heavy speculating on the reasons for striking East Timor off the agenda of the Commission.
Willem Offenberg, reporter for the Dutch newspaper Trouw, said that the lack of the originals of the Indonesian manuals with among others instructions concerning torture, was crucial for striking Indonesia off the 'black list'. 1)

Recently Justice and Peace received a copy of these discussions on East Timor within the 1503-procedure by the Commission on Human Rights in February 1985. The document, written in French, bears no. E/CN.4/1985/SR38, the pages 5 up to 16 inclusive, numbers 24 upto 80 inclusive concern East Timor. It is interesting to see which were the reasons for the Commission to strike Eeast Timor off the 'black list'.
After the more or less usual argumentation of Indonesia on 'communications' received concerning violations, and critical remarks from Ireland and Finland intended for Indonesia, Japan notes (in no. 53) that a large number of the cases referred to in the 'communications' are from an earlier date and that a relatively small part concerns 1984. Besides, "des témoignages d'observateurs et de témoins sur lesquels il faut aussi s'appuyer et notament ceux des diplomats et des représentants d'organisations internationales" observed improvements.

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1) Trouw, dated March 3, 1985: "Indonesië geschrapt van zwarte lijst mensenrechten".

Germany supports this with the aforementioned statement (page 44) that the global impression of the German parliamentary delegation was that the situation in the area had improved (no. 45).

Austria wishes to know if there really is an 'exemplaire du manuel d'instruction' present, of which Amnesty reports (no. 60, source of the aforementioned newspaper article). Subsequently Senegal opens the attack by putting the discussion on East Timor on debate. Now that particularly Japan and Germany have received news of an improvement from reliable sources, according to Senegal, and also the 'rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans le monde présenté au Congrès des Etats-Unis d'Amérique' finds this, the Commission should profit "de la discrépation de la situation et favoriser le processus d'ouverture amorcé" (no. 62). Jordan, using the first move of Senegal, finishes off the proposition where it states that it is of the opinion that "(la commission) pourrait envisager de se dessaisir de la situation en Indonésie, dans l'esprit constructif évoqué par le représentant du Sénégal" (no. 67). A proposition supported by the Philippines.

Short after this, the votes were taken, which results in 9 votes in favour and 11 against, so that quite in the spirit of the propositions of Senegal and Jordan, the recommandation of the preliminary study group to maintain East Timor for further studies, has been rejected.

Although one should realise that probably a number of other reflections which did not come up for consideration, also played a part in the taking of this decision, the notes clearly show that the improvements observed by observers has played a major part. Senegal calls upon "témoignages dignes de foi", being the German parliamentary delegation and the "rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans le monde présenté au Congrès des Etats-Unis d'Amerique". The visit of the German delegation was discussed before (paragraph 8.2) and we found out that the pronouncement of the German governmental representative that "l'impression globale de ces parlementaires est que la situation dans le territoire c'est améliorée" was absolutely not covered by the experiences of the members of parliament (as stated in their report).

The description of the American report of course points in the direction of the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984 (which was discussed and commented upon extensively on page 45). Senegal, however, reads in this report that "l'analfabétisme au Timor oriental a diminué, tombant de 85% à 63%", something which we did not find in the Country Report for 1984. Although it is not clear which report is meant by Senegal, it calls for concern that in a commission meeting so much weight is put on an American report, when we have seen earlier in three other American government reports that it holds errors, inaccuracies and important omissions, and an insufficient argumentation.

Not only the calling upon certain observers who would have established an improvement is doubtful, also the improvement itself is questionable. In relation to the classical human rights there were some concrete accusations from Amnesty amongst others. Although it has not been said in so many words during the meeting, with 'improvement' mainly the quickened socio-economic developments will have been looked at (see page 27). Amnesty recently remarked on this:
"... The Indonesian Government has stated that the human rights situation in East Timor is improving and that in support of this officials have made frequent references to programs of socio-economic development in East Timor. This is, however, not relevant to the particular concerns Amnesty International has addressed ...". 1)
Earlier we noted that the facts presented by Indonesia point in the direction of a speeded up socio-economic development. However, critical signals from the Timorese community arouse the suspicion that the claimed improvement is not or not always to the benefit of the Timorese population (see page 28). It is also feasable that in 1983 (second half) and 1984 the food shortages have been preceded by military operations. We can justly wonder if the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations in 1985 did not store disproportionally much importance to the socio-economic improvements claimed by Indonesia, of which the depth and range cannot yet be seen.

Finally, in the commission's discussions the element that many cases mentioned in the communications were cases from before 1984 and only a relatively small part on 1984 itself (no. 53), which was established by Japan, also played a part. So Senegal proposes that "l'on ne s'attarde pas trop sur des anciens". Technically spoken it was perhaps practically and efficient, but for those who have to co-operate day in day out with the Indonesian army, this is a complete illusion:
"Nous ne pouvons construire l'avenir sur un présent miné par des erreurs passées. Nous devons avoir le courage d'analyser ces erreurs passées ..." 2)

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1) Amnesty International, statement on East Timor to the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization, dated August 8, 1985, p.2; underlining author.

2) Message de l'Administrateur et du Conseil Presbytérial du diocèse de Dili, dated January 1, 1985, p.2.

according to Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council.
One look in the extensive report on East Timor which was published in 1985 by Amnesty, learns that this report is filled with 'old cases'. This is not without a reason; on the grounds of this information it is possible to show a certain pattern: "The most wide spread of violations have occurred in recurrent waves and have generally been associated with times of increased military activity." 1)
The remarks of Senegal and Japan are dubious; after all the Commission itself did cut its task with the criterium: "que les communications doivent pouvoir l'existence d'un ensemble de violations flagrantes et systématiques ...". 2)

9.2 The General Assembly; talks between Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the Secretary General

Up to and including 1982 the General Assembly of the United Nations yearly acknowledged the right to self-determination for the Timorese people in a resolution. All these resolutions have been ignored by Indonesia. This is why the General Assembly thought to find a way out of this stalemate by requesting the Secretary General "to initiate consultations on the question of East Timor with all parties concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem" (resolution no. 37/30, 1982). Just before the General Assembly in 1983, the Secretary General informed the General Assembly (on 19-8-1984, note A/38/352) that "in view of recent developments" he did not think it well-timed to give an extensive report to the General Assembly of his endeavours. The General Committee, which draws up the draft agenda of the General Assembly, recommends the General Assembly, after a proposition from Norway, to postpone the discussions on East Timor for one year, to which is agreed (conclusion 38/402 dated 23-9-1983). From the Progress Report of the Secretary General (dated 25-7-1985, A/39/361) it shows that these 'recent developments' had reference to the "initiation of direct contacts' (no. 7, Progress Report).

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1) Amnesty Internationa, East Timor violations of human rights, 1985, p. 8.

2) Resolution 1 (XXIV) of the subcommission concerning Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, quoted by the Indonesian representative before the commission, no.26, E/CN.4/1985/SR38.

Also in 1984, this time after a suggestion from Iceland, the General Assembly decides (conclusion 39)402, dated 21-9-1984) to postponement of the discussions. The 'direct contacts' established in July 1983 between the permanent representatives of Indonesia and Portugal lead in November 1984 to the first "substantive talks", in the words of the Secretary General.
Three sessions take place: from November 12 to 16, 1984, from January 7 to 9, 1985, and from March 18 to 22, 1985. In this Progress Report dated 11-10-1985 (A/40/622) the Secretary General reports to the General Assembly on these negotiations. According to Associated Press the General Assembly once again, upon a proposition from Senegal, postpones the discussions on East Timor. 1)

9.2.1 The status of the talks between Indonesia and Portugal

How do the parties themselves look upon these talks? Indonesia tries to do its very best to minimize the importance of these talks: "Dr. Mochtar told journalists ... Jakarta was anxious to make it clear that the contacts were not negotiations. As far as Indonesia is concerned, East Timor is settled" 2) and "Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumatmadja said ... Indonesia would never accept the participation of Timorese representatives, and he had entered the talks with this understanding with Portugal ... no substantive issues of sovereignty were being debated, nor would they be". 3)

Portugal on the other hand only sees the talks as a first step. In a speach before the General Assembly dated 23-9-1985 Dr. Jaime Gama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said about the talks: "We can say that the results already achieved in these talks are important ... We have already made clear several times before, the goals we have imposed ourselves: that is, the search of their (the East Timorese people) right to self-determination ... We hope sincerely that some of the results already achieved as well as the overcoming of the difficulties will lead us through the only path we consider viable ...". 4)
Finally, the Secretary General does not commit himself with the words: "It was agreed that these talks would commence with consideration of humanitarian issues, on the understanding that they would ultimately deal with the

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1) Press release Associated Press, 00387, PIW0276 02 27, UN-Portugal, 0234.
2) East Timor Report no. 8, p. 4, basing itself on The Age, July 28, 1984,
3) Jill Joliffe, F.E.E.R., September 19, 1985, p.17.

4) Address by H.E. the Minister for Foreign Affais of Portugal, Dr. Jaime Gama, to the 41st session of the G.A. of the U.N., dated September 23, 1985, p.25; underlining author.

the question in a comprehensive way, thus facilitating an international acceptabele settlement of the question." 1)

With this the question for the status and range of the talks was finally left to the General Assembly. Indonesia has been able to win over this institution step by step in favour of its standpoint with great diplomatic skill (see the developments in the voting on the resolutions about East Timor upto 1982).

9.2.2 Participants in the talks

The formula which was applies by the General Assembly in its resolution in 1982 'to initiate consultations ... with all parties concerned' (underlining author), leaves room to the Secretary General to invite other parties than Portugal and Indonesia.

There could be purely political reasons at the basis of this.

The admittance of FRETILIN as a party to the discussion will mean the recognition of FRETILIN as a political relevant factor. This is why Indonesia strongly resists this. Yet the thought of inviting FRETILIN to the discussions goes further than pure political recognition. As it is known Indonesia has tried in vain to eliminate FRETILIN on the military front. It does not look like a change in this situation within the foreseeable future (in spite of all claims of Indonesia). A, to a certain extent, politically realistic valuation of the local balance of power in East Timor, can be the foundation for the choice for a direct approach of the conflict between the fighting parties. For instance for Mgr. Belo, who emphasized the importance of the starting again of the negotiations between FRETILIN and Indonesia (see pages 32 and 33).

Besides political reasons there also could be brought up more technical reasons for the increase of the number of participants in the talks under the auspices of the U.N.

The participation of Portugal, as is know, is based on an - international-judicial correct - fiction of Portugal as 'administrative power'. On the grounds of this status, Portugal acts as representative and promotor of the interests of the Timorese people.

It has to be kept in mind that Portugal officially has not set foot on East Timor for ten years and thus there must be a serious lack of its knowledge.

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1) Progress Report of the Secretary General dated September 11, 1985, A/40/622.

In this light Portugal answers the question of the Secretary General for information, in accordance with its obligations as 'administrative power', since 1979 with the following standard formula (1) (art. 73rd of the UN-Charta): "... The Government of Portugal reiterated ... that it had nothing to add to the information provided in its note of 6 April 1979 ... At the time it had stated ... it regretted being unable to provide the information requested", This is why Portugal requested the Netherlands to let its Ambassador travel round in East Timor in order to obtain information. It is reasonable to wonder whether Portugal is at all fit to represent the interests of the Timorese population adequately because of this lack of knowledge.

This lack of information now plays a trick on Portugal in the talks with Indonesia in U.N. context. For example, there have been given several 'assurances' on religious freedom according to the Progress Report of the Secretary General. The question immediately arises as to what these 'assurances' are worth. Neither the U.N. nor Portugal can check this because Indonesia will never allow 'fact-finding missions' into the country. There again from the Timorese church there are signals that these 'assurances' are much less significant than supposed where mentioned in the Progress Report of the Secretary General. Indonesia gave the assurance that there was "complete freedom to profess and practice all religions" (no. 12 Progress Report). We have already pointed (page 38) at the direct check on the church. The these 'suffering and pain' in sermons is forbidden; sermons and pastoral visits to christian communities in the inlands are being supervised by soldiers in disguise. Indonesia also gave the assurance that the clergy has complete freedom of movement (also no. 12 Progress Report). Earlier we have mentioned the 'surat-jalan' (see page 16). Also the clergy is subject to this system. It is not a mere formality. In this light Mgr. Belo could not visit Laterin Mutin during a visit to this region in November 1984. (2) Also in interviews Mgr. Belo pointed at the limited freedom of movement (see page 32) several times. Indonesia assured that the catholic church "had full authority on the parochial/school system". We have heard from different sources that the curriculum is completely determined by the government and, to the great disappointment of the church, is completely organized on Indonesian lines.

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1) See for instance no. 11 of the working paper prepared by the Secretariat dated August 1, 1985, A/Ac.109/836 and no. 7 working paper prepared by the Secretariat dated August 3, 1984, A/AC.109/783.

2) Em Timor Leste a Paz é Possivél no. 13, p. 8.

"This is why we (the church; author's note) do not think it necessary to found more new schools for independant education". 1)
Finally Indonesia assures, according to the Progress Report, that "foreign-born missionaries (can) enter the Territory, in accordance with immigration regulations". In practice this means that although there is a great shortage of priests on East Timor (the number of priests per 1000 catholics is the lowest in all of Asia, and 5 priests lower than the rest of Indonesia (see page 37), practically no foreign priests are being allowed into the country. 2)

Not only with the 'assurances' given by Indonesia, but also with the discussions on the subject religious freedom in general, questions arise from the Timorese church. For Portugal the subject of religious liberty is possibly a diplomatic entrance (which is not such a tense subject) to more political subjects in the future.
A Timorese priest writes in a reaction on the U.N.-talks: "It would not be realistic to talk about the church and its problems outside the context of politics ... There is absolutely no use to talk about religious freedom in an occupied area like Timor, where there is talk of military and civil intervention from the side of the Indonesian government in all fields ... If is is impossible to imagine a political freedom, within the present political context, which guarantees the practice of the fundamental rights of a nation, then it is certainly naive and childish to speak about religious liberty." 3) That is why the message of Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council does not touch the fact whether or not Indonesia violates the religious liberty as such but it states only: "En accusant les prêtres, arrêtant les cathéchists et déportant et tuant les chrétiens, on essaye de détruire le réligiosité du peuple". 4)

Summarizing it can be said that not only from a political perspective, but also on behalf of an adequate representation of the interests of the Timorese population, and in order to prevent the talks deminishing to an academic,

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1) See Tomado de posiçao perante o documento Religious Life in East Timor, May 20, 1985, p. 4, and Tomado de posiçao de un cristao timorense frente a situaçao de guerre em Timor Leste, February 20, 1985, p. 4.

2) According to Em Timor Leste a Paz Possível, no. 13, p. 8, two priests; from other well informed sources none.

3) Tomado de posiçao perante o documento Religious Life in East Timor, May 20, 1985, p. 1B.

4) Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique et Conseil Presbyteral du diocèse de Dili, January 1, 1985, p.5.

'weltfremd' level (as happened on the subject of religious liberty), a direct contribution of the Timorese society is necessary to the talks between Portugal and Indonesia under auspices of the U.N. "Nous appelons également à ce que soient créés les conditions indispensables à un dialogue ouvert, loyal et fructueux entre toutes les parties intéressées à la solution du problème, en particulier le peuple de Timor, universellement représenté par les mouvements actuellement actifs soit à l'intérieur du territoir soit à l'extérieur ...". 1)

9.2.3 Contents of the talks

The talks concern the following subjects:
- repatriation of former Portuguese civil servants
- repatriation of some Timorese exiles in Portugal
- religious freedom
- protection and safe-guarding of the cultural heritage
- social-economic circumstances (see no.10 Progress Report).

As regards the first two items, the report mentions some concrete agreements to move on fast. On the other subjects the report limits itself to the neutral formulation that "information was provided". Apart from this some concrete 'assurances' were given. On the value of these 'assurances' with regard to religious liberty we have already commented before (page 55). Apart from all this, Indonesia gave "assurances concerning the protestion of the ethnic and cultural heritage".
Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council remark on this: "Essayer d'indonésianiser le peuple Timorais au travers de fortes campagnes de 'Pancasila', d'écoles, de moyens de communications sociales, aliénant sa 'Weltanschauung', c'est assassiner progressivement la culture Timoraise".

'Assurances' were also given on the food situation. Also on this subject we have some questions which are based on experiences from the past (see page 24), namely that Indonesian military operations often go hand in hand with a worsening of the food situation and lead to local shortages.

A comparison between the Progress Report of the Secretary General and the statement of the Portuguese delegation before another U.N-organ, namely the

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1) Message de l'Administrateur Apostolique et Conseil Presbytéral du diocèse de Dili, January 1, 1985, p.7.

38th session of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, arises the suspicion that also Portugal has its doubts on what is called 'assurances' in the Progress Report of the Secretary General: the last session between Portugal and Indonesia has only just ended (namely on August 22, 1985), and Portugal states before the Subcommission: "Another matter of concern ty my Government is the preservation of the ethnic, cultural and religious identity of the Timorese people ... The rights of this minority should be respected. This is a subject that in our view deserves the attention of the distinguished members of the Subcommission." 1)

Is it possible that the results of the negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia have been made to look better in the Progress Report than the facts justify, because of a desire for fast, concrete results? (The present mandate of de Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary General, expires in 1986.) The hope that Perez de Cuillar expresses in the final paragraph of the Progress Report seems to confirm this:

"It is therefore my sincere hope that, in the coming months, ... the consideration of the political, civil and other aspects will prepare ground for a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement of the question ..." (no. 25 Progress Report; underlining author).

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1) Statement by the Portuguese Delegation under item 6 of the Agenda, 38th session of the Subcommission on Prevention and Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, dated August 26, 1985; underlining author.

10. CONCLUSIONS

Military situation

1. Operation Peunion in 1983 - 1984 , did not lead to the military elimination of FRETILIN, also in 1985 guerrilla attacks still take place. Some tens of numbers of deaths occur monthly on Indonesian side.
   According to most sources FRETILIN exists of around one thousand armed guerrillas, supported by a few thousand relatives.

2. Justice and Peace is concerned on the fact that FRETILIN-fihters have resorted to intimidation of civilians in the past two years, in order to obtain food etc. Also some civilians have been killed. FRETILIN announced itself that civilians who collaborated had been executed by them.
   The scale on which all this takes place is unkown, and the Indonesians claim that FRETILIN has degenerated to the level of a 'gang of raiders' is unfounded.

Human rights, executions, disappearances, further aspects

3. In 1983-1984 many people have disappeared or have been executed, according to several organizations, among which Amnesty International. Amnesty also reported mass executions. In 1985 less violations have been reported, but this fits into the pattern (of a military calm period) and is as such no indication for improvement.

4. - The aid of the International Red Cross to prisoners is too limited up to this day in reach and duration, to guarantee their well-being effectively.
   - It is doubtful whether the trial of ex-guerrillas meets the commonly acknowledged principles of jurisdiction.
   - The freedom of movement of the civilians is very limited.
   - To this day civilians are being recruted for military and civil work.
   - The present decrease of the number of interned people on Atauro is not based upon a change in policy on the desirability of this internment, so there is no guarantee for a continuing decrease in the future.

Socio-economic, development food situation, International Red Cross, Indonesian efforts

5. It is feasable that the military operations in 1983 and 1984 led to local food shortages. Apparently the situation in 1985 quickly recovered.
   A repeat of this during military operations in the future is well possible.

6. During the military operations in 1983-1984, the Indonesian authorities have strongly limited the activities of the International Red Cross. On this too a repeat is well possible in future.

7. Indonesia develops East Timor on the socio-economic field in a speeded up pace; the reach and depth of this is unknown: independant, serious evaluations do not exist, there are doubts as to the question whether these developments come to the benefit of the Timorese population.

The Catholic Church

8. Mgr. Filipe Ximenes Belo has continued the lines of his strongly criticized predecessor Mgr. da Costa Lopes on the subject of the defence of human rights. He further pleads for the resumption of the negotiations which were broken off in 1983.

9. Justice and Peace is convinced of the authority of the massage issued on January 1, 1985, by Mgr. Belo and the Presbyterian Council. In connection with the formulation of the Pope (July 1984) they point at the recent developments which are disastrous for the ethnic, religious and cultural identity of the Timorese people.

Reports on East Timor

10. The reports on East Timor in three American Government reports contain a number of errors, inaccuracies, important omissions, and on several places there is insufficient argumentation.

11. Journalists who visit East Timor at the invitation of Indonesia are sufficiently aware of the dangers which are connected with this: the strongly guided character on the one hand and the great political import of their reports on the other hand.

United Nations Commissions on Human Rights

12. The West-German representative has given incorrect information on the experiences of the West-German parliamentary delegation, during the confidential 1503-procedure of the 1985 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, in favour of Indonesia.

13. The decision of the Commission on Human Rights in March 1985, not to discuss East Timor any longer, raises a number of questions:
    - In the discussion, it shows from the notes, one calls upon German (see 12) and American (no. 10) reports. This basis is infuccicient:

- Too much value is attached to the socio-economic development, claimed by Indonesia.
- By leaving 'older cases of violation' outside the discussions, the pattern of violations which can be shown by them, is being disregarded.

Negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal

14. Adequate representation of the interests of the Timorese demands direct participation from the Timorese society, as shown by the disappointing course by the talks on religious liberty.

15. Justice and Peace does not have the impression that the results offer serious guarantees in the area of religious freedom, the cultural identity or the socio-economic development. This as a contrast with the Secretary General of the U.N., as shown from his report.

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